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New from the University of Texas Press
THE COMMUNITY FORESTS OF MEXICO
Managingfor Sustainable Landscapes

Edited by David Barton Bray,
Leticia Merino-Perez, and Deborah Barry
Mexico leads the world in community management of forests for the commercial production of
timber. Yet this success story is not widely
known, even in Mexico, despite the fact that
communities around the globe are increasingly
involved in managing their own forest resources.
To assess the achievements and shortcomings of
Mexico's community forest management programs and to offer approaches that can be
applied in other parts of the world, this book collects fourteen articles that explore community
forest management from historical, policy, economic, ecological, sociological and political perspectives.
The contributors to this book are established
researchers in the field, as well as many of the
important actors in Mexico's nongovernmental
organization sector. Some articles are case studies

David Barton Bray is professor of environmental
studies and directorof the Institutefor Sustainability
Science in Latin America and the Caribbeanat
FloridaInternationalUniversity in Miami.

of community forest management programs in
the states of Michoacdn, Oaxaca, Durango,
Quintana Roo and Guerrero. Others provide
broader historical and contemporary overviews of
various aspects of community forest manage-

Leticia Merino-Perez is a faculty member of the
Institute of Social Research at the National
Autonomous University ofMexico.

that the community forest sector in Mexico is

Deborah Barry is a program officer with the Ford
Foundation.She founded PRISMA, a Salvadoran
NGO specializing in agrarianenvironmental

large, diverse, and has achieved unusual maturity

research.

ment. As a whole, this volume clearly establishes

in doing what communities in the rest of the
world are only beginning to explore: how to balance community income with forest conservation. In this process, Mexican communities are
also managing for sustainable landscapes and
livelihoods.

University of Texas Press

P.O. Box 7819
Austin, Texas 7813-7819
Tel. 512-471-4032
www.utexaspress.com
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FROM THE GUEST

EDITOR

The Latin American Military
in the New Millennium

O

the Council on
n
October 26,
1998,
Hemispheric
Affairs
heralded the formalization of the peace
agreement between Ecuador and
Peru as the final settlement of the
"hemisphere's last armed territorial
dispute." In effect, the signing of this
accord in Brasilia by Presidents Jamil
Mahuad of Ecuador and Alberto
Fujimori of Peru ended one of the
most acrimonious and virulent enmities in the Western Hemisphere since

the Chaco War between Bolivia and
Paraguay in the 1930s. Diplomacy
had triumphed over the use of military force as a conflict-solving mechanism.

The immediate result of this resolution was the elimination of the
most urgent traditional threat to
interstate peace and security in Latin
America. More importantly, however,
the diplomatic settlement of the
Ecuadorian-Peruvian militarized dispute signaled the end of conventional security threats in the region and
the completion of a long-evolving
process of intraregional, interstate
peace. Moreover, it was a clear indication to the region's decision makers
and militaries that a transition in
doctrine, posture, strategy, training

and mission was not only desirable
but necessary. The recognition of
these military policy implications
became more critical in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, in the United States, and

the emergence and intensification of
new security threats, ranging from
human contraband and transnational
urban gang warfare to biochemical

and nuclear terrorism. The convergence of these security trends in the
new millennium effectively rendered
obsolete the traditional configuration
and posture of the Latin American
militaries, exposing more overtly the
need for a major transformation of
the region's armed forces.
Recognizing the importance of the
military institution in Latin
American politics and societies, Dr.

Eduardo A. Gamarra, editor of
Hemisphere, invited me to serve as
guest editor of this issue devoted
entirely to the military and security
in the new millennium. I gladly
accepted the honor and proceeded to
assemble an international group of
civil-military, defense and security
experts for the purpose of examining
the various aspects of the military
institution with respect to its old and
new missions, its internal composition, and its potential and actual
impact on national, regional and
international politics. With these
general themes in mind, my own feature essay examines whether the military has become obsolete, given the
prevalence of intraregional peace and
the nature of new security threats. I
argue that the military in its present
form does not serve the socioeconomic and security needs of Latin
American polities and, in fact, repre-

sents a budgetary drain and potential
threat to national political processes.
I conclude by advocating the
revamping of the military into a
smaller, highly mobile, technically
sophisticated and totally defensive
force under strict civilian control.
Rut Diamint in her feature article
points out that, in the current inter-

national environment, the quality of
democracy is as important in interstate relations as other tools of statecraft, including the military apparatus. But given the present tension
between democratic weaknesses and
new threats in Latin America, she
suggests rethinking the military. She
discusses the legitimacy of democratic values, the present military identity
crisis, the current budgetary constraints, the internationalization of
military missions, and the increased
transparency among military estab-

lishments in the post-Cold War period as important factors that have
affected the military institution. Yet,
she explains that many are demanding the return of the military to serve
in urban law and order functions.
She counsels against bringing the
military back to serve in this capacity.
Instead, she argues that national and
civil security depends on respect for
constitutional order.
Michael Collier in his feature article introduces the OAS Declaration
of Security (2003) and discusses the
expansion of the list of security
threats facing the Americas. Based on
an analysis of this document, he proceeds to develop a multidimensional
security model for organizing the
21st century security forces in the

region. He examines the differing
organizational cultures, unclear jurisdictions and command and control
procedures, failures to share information, and sovereignty concerns. He
argues that these are some of the
challenges to implementing the
model.
Kristina Mani in her contribution
analyzes the internationalization of
Hemisphere Volume 16

3

From the Guest Editor

the military since the 1990s via traditional UN peacekeeping missions
and the contracting of former soldiers and police by private military
firms for service abroad. She warns
that this adds a complex layer to
existing concerns over the roles that
the military should assume in the
environment of electoral democracy.
She describes how internationalization provides Latin American militaries with opportunities and
resources that they lack in their
domestic environment, discusses
peacekeeping and contracting trends
in the region, and identifies some
consequences from involvement in
both areas of activity. She concludes
that peacekeeping is no longer the
solution for military transformation
and that while military contracting
improves economic conditions for a
few countries, it may carry sociopolitical costs.
In his essay, Paul Taylor discusses
the failure of policy makers to pay
attention to the potential effects of
free trade agreements on national
security. He examines both NAFTA
and CAFTA-DR in reference to

their actual and potential effects on
national security issues. He discusses
how these relate to factors that purportedly foster domestic sociopolitical disruption, strengthen democracy, increase illegal immigration, and
improve relations with the United
States. The article surmises that each
of these factors will play out differently from country to country.
This issue contains several reports
on more country-specific military

affairs. Miguel Centeno looks into
the future of Cuba's Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias (FAR). He reflects
on the inevitable scenario of a postCastro Cuba, where the Maximum
Leader's "personal and historic
charisma" will no longer serve as a
control mechanism and link to the
future. Centeno discusses a number
of potential crisis situations and

4
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sociopolitical anxieties. He underscores the pivotal role the FAR could
play in a post-Castro milieu; but he
laments the lack of knowledge about
the internal affairs of the Cuban
armed forces. Comparing the FAR
to the Iraqi military in 2003, he
hopes that social order could be
maintained in Cuba. He concludes
that "the only possible way" to guarantee this end is if the FAR, as an
institution, remains as a "guarantor
of internal peace and defender of the
national territory."
Arturo Sotomayor in his report on
the Mexican military concedes that
US hegemony is rampant in every
aspect of Mexican society, except in
military affairs. He argues that
while the US has emphasized military and strategic affairs in Latin

America, Mexico has de-emphasized
these foreign policy goals. He con-

siders the important and comprehensive institutional changes that
have taken place in Mexico during
the recent transition to democracy,
but maintains that the Mexican military has not kept pace with these
transformations. In fact, he argues
that presently the Mexican military
is "probably less modern and effective and far more politicized and
nationalist than 10 years ago."

Accordingly, he examines the evolutionary process in Mexico and its

effect on the military. He concludes
that political liberalization in Mexico
"has made the armed forces even
more inward-looking, nationalist
and xenophobic."
Hdctor Saint-Pierre and

Erica

Winand examine Brazil's defense
policy under the administration of
President Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva.

They claim that in its relations with
the military, Lula's administration is
committing mistakes similar to
those of previous governments. It
has allowed the armed forces to take
on greater secondary domestic missions, transgressing their constitu-

tionally defined functions. The
authors examine how this policy has
come to pass and its implications for
democratic consolidation.
Moreover, they concede-as
Diamint and others have alluded to
in this issue-that the lack of
domestic security has prompted
many Brazilians "to knock on the
doors of military barracks looking
for a solution to their plight." They
advise against this practice and argue
that it may produce greater politicization of the military in Brazil.
They conclude that the use of the
military for political and law and
order functions increases the risks to
democracy.
This issue of Hemisphere features a
photo essay entitled "Promoting
Security Cooperation" by Jose Ruiz
from the Public Affairs Office of the
US Southern Command in Miami,
Florida. As the title reveals, it highlights the role of the US military in
humanitarian and collaborative security functions in the Americas.
Finally, Marian Goslinga wraps up
the issue with a bibliography of new
and recent titles on civil-military
relations, new security threats, and
the Latin American military institution.

In closing, I would like to extend
my appreciation to Dr. Eduardo
Gamarra for trusting my editorial
ideas and skills. I would also like to
underscore the crucial behind-thescenes contributions to the successful publication of this issue of managing editor Pedro Botta, Dr.

Michael Collier, Eloisa L6pez, Liesl
Picard and Jorge G6mez. Finally, I
extend to the authors my most sincere appreciation for adhering diligently to all deadlines and for putting aside their own work in order
to share graciously with us the fruits
of their research, analyses and ideas.
FZLX E.MARTIN
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External Peace, Internal Violence
by FSlix E. Martin

nternal political violence,
military coups, dictatorships,

The Militarist Peace
The Militarist Peace argument

counterinsurgency campaigns and low-intensity

advances the notion of the transnationalization of the Latin American
military; in other words, that members of the armed forces develop
shared socioeconomic values, beliefs
and principles that foster increasing
identification with the interests and
success of other military institutions across intraregional boundaries. In societies without effective
civilian control over the armed
forces, the military institution is a
pivotal, organized and disciplined
national political actor. Latin
America's militaries have been at
the center (or have been the gatekeepers) of the war-making decision process in each state, with the
power to influence decisively
whether to pursue national political
objectives via the external use of
force. Understandably, social
power can produce a desired outcome-in this case, intraregional,
interstate peace-only if the actor
in a position of power decides to
pursue such an objective. In the

warfare have plagued the history of Latin American states.

Less evident is the fact that these
countries have engaged in traditional intraregional war only once
since 1935. In 189 years (18162005), Latin American countries
waged only six major wars (i.e.,

military conflicts netting at least
1000 battlefield fatalities): four in
the 19th century, one in the first
half of the 20th century, and only
one since the end of the Chaco War
in 1935 (the 1969 Soccer War
between El Salvador and
Honduras). Yet Latin America's

militaries have continued to arm
and train for traditional warfare
against regional threats. Even in

the current environment of relative
peace and intraregional coopera-

tion, the armed forces' existential
justification, configuration and
power are based on the presumption of a conventional threat to
state sovereignty from a neighboring enemy.
This article takes the Militarist
Peace argument as the basis for an
inquiry into the symbolic and functional needs of the Latin American
military in its traditional posture.
It argues that the military in its

present form represents a budgetary
drain and a potential threat to
national political processes. It concludes by advocating the revamping
of the military into a smaller, highly mobile, technically sophisticated
and wholly defensive force under
strict civilian control.

6
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post-Chaco War period, Latin

America's military institutions have
lacked the motivation or interest to
wage external wars. Instead, the
sizable stake of the military in the
national political process has made
the armed forces inward-looking
and profoundly concerned with
internal threats to their institutional
interests. This evolutionary
dynamic leads directly to the paradox of external peace and internal
political violence in Latin America.
Latin American states with long

democratic traditions and lingering
territorial disputes have experienced

internal political violence in an
environment of intraregional, interstate peace. For example, the peri-

od of intense political violence in
Colombian history known as La
Violencia caused more than
200,000 deaths from 1946 to
1964, and the country's current
domestic insurgency has been going

on for the last 30 years. In 1973,
Chile experienced the most brutal
and violent military coup in South
American history. The political
repression left a toll of close to
2000 dead and hundreds disappeared, ending four decades of
internal political peace and uninter-

rupted democratic rule. Finally,
since 1958 Venezuelan democracy
has been shaken several times by
intense political violence and insurgency, including El Caracazo, the

intense street protests in Caracas in
February 1989; the foiled coup
attempt against President Carlos
Andrds Pdrez in February 1992;
and the protests and brief military
coup against President Hugo

Chivez Frias in April 2002. None
of these countries, however, resorted to military means to settle bilateral disputes with their neighbors,
despite conflicts between, for
instance, Colombia and Venezuela,
and Chile and Peru.
The difference between the military's regional and national behaviors is primarily the consequence of
institutional interests and motivations that have evolved consistently
throughout the post-Chaco War
period. This social process redirected the focus of the military mission
from protecting the state against

external threats to seeking internal

Features

The obsolescence of the Latin American military

Delegates at the signing of the Chaco Treaty in Buenos Aires, 1938. The treatyformalized the 1935 ceasefire that ended one
of the bloodiest interstate conflicts in Latin American history. The Chaco War stands as the turningpoint in the collective mentality and attitude of the Latin American military.

American military. First, the pro-

trol away from the armed bands
that served the interests of local
caudillos, who disregarded national
boundary lines and sparked bilateral armed conflicts for personal gain,
and shifted it to an officer corps
made up of better educated and less
adventurous individuals with more
respect for their institutional obligations, neighboring military establishments and international borders. Military professionalization
reduced dramatically the level of

tinuation of this process, the "new"
professionalism in the 1950s
increased the internal political role
of the military. Alfred Stepan
draws a distinction between the old
professionalism of external warfare
and the new professionalism of
internal security and national development. The success of revolutionary warfare against conventional
armies in the 1950s and 1960s, he
argues, led the armed forces to
focus on military and political

fessionalization of the armed forces
in the late 19th century took con-

intraregional, interstate violence
prevalent prior to 1886. In a con-

strategies to combat or prevent

security and political control of the
government. In the long term, it

has generated a universal disinterest
among Latin America's military

establishments in pursuing political
and strategic objectives via the
external use of force.
The Process of Military

Socialization
Four historical factors have
shaped the evolution of the Latin

domestic insurrection, shifting their
Hemisphere Volume 16

Features

mission from external to internal
warfare. Ultimately, these twin
processes of military professionalization decreased the level of
intraregional, interstate violence
and increased domestic violence
and military politicization.
Second, the fratricidal Chaco
War stands as the turning point in
the collective mentality and attitude
of the Latin American military. In
contrast to the intraregional, interstate wars of the 19th century,
which were fought between unprofessional caudillo armies, remnants
of the wars of independence, local
militia bands, adventurers and soldier-statesmen, the war between
Bolivia and Paraguay was the first
major conflict since the professionalization of the armed forces began
in 1886. The high number of
casualties and the material and
moral costs sustained by both military establishments represent the
first clear evidence for the regional
militaries that during times of war,
officers and soldiers bear the brunt
of the suffering. The most significant lesson of the war, however, was
the political discredit of the military in both countries for permitting foreign commercial interests to
manipulate them and drive them to
battle. The Chaco War sensitized
the military to the institutional,
socioeconomic, political and
human costs of intraregional, interstate wars. Within two years of its
conclusion, Bolivia and Paraguay
underwent political upheaval, succession of governments and social
unrest. This episode may have
taught Latin America's militaries
that they did not need an external
war to increase their domestic political power and, perhaps, made
them realize that war was not only
very costly, but could eventually
lead to national unrest and loss of
political power-a lesson the
Argentine military was forced to
8
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relearn decades later after the South
Atlantic fiasco. Less than two years
after the Anglo-Argentine conflict,
the military not only had to surrender control of the government to
civilian authorities but, more
important, many officers lost their
individual freedom when they were
incarcerated at home and sought
abroad by other countries' justice
systems for abuses committed while
in power. In addition to the political and human costs, the military
institution in Argentina was
reduced considerably (in its budget,
equipment, personnel and political
role) by successive civilian governments after 1984.
Third, the process of socialization
continued its course and acquired
added strength during and after the
Second World War. The effort by
the United States to organize a
hemispheric defense pact against an
extracontinental power in the postwar period brought Latin America's
militaries closer together. Officers
from around the region attended
military training schools together
and met at conferences and socialpolitical functions that allowed
them to mingle in a more relaxed
social setting than in their respective governmental positions. The
end of World War II also ushered
in a greater politicization of the
military. Latin Americas armed

forces began to perceive one another as members of a loosely organized supranational structure
engaged mostly in political competition for control over the governments of their respective states. As
a result, they began to see other
socioeconomic groups, political factions and organizations in their
own countries as their true enemies
rather than their military counterparts across national borders.
Finally, the politicization and
gradual amalgamation of all military sectors in Latin America into

an overarching regional socioeconomic and political institution
gained further momentum after the
Costa Rican Civil War of 1948 and
the Cuban Revolution of 1959.
The immediate and permanent dissolution of the Costa Rican armed
forces after 1948 and the overthrow
of Fulgencio Batista's military dicta-

torship in Cuba demonstrated that
socioeconomic and political discontent at home, properly channeled
by urban political opposition
groups and armed guerrillas in the
countryside, could seriously undermine the socioeconomic, political
and institutional interests of the
military in any country in the
region. The dismantling of the old
military institution in Costa Rica
and Cuba, the new Cuban leadership's subsequent turn toward the
Soviet orbit, and Cuba's active promotion and support of leftist guerrillas in Latin America during the

1960s instilled great fear and distrust in the military. It became
clear to armed forces everywhere
that they had to stand together and
address the economic needs and
socioeconomic and political discontent of their people. Their response
was a two-pronged approach: first,
to engage actively in economic
development projects and, second,
to control all national socioeconomic and political groups and
organizations in their respective
polities.
The Incongruity of Military
Posture and Function
Paradoxically, while interstate
peace has matured in Latin America

and a stronger spirit of cooperation
and understanding has set in, the
region's militaries continue to
spend, arm and train in preparation
for traditional security threats. A
look at military expenditures as
reported in the SIPRI Yearbook for
2004 reveals that in the period from

Features

1994 to 2002, only Argentina,
Bolivia and Venezuela reduced their
military spending by an average 0.3
percent of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). The rest of the countries in
the region actually increased their
respective shares, with Colombia
leading the pack at 1.6 percent;
Ecuador, 1.0; Chile, 0.6; Paraguay

and Peru, 0.5 each; and Brazil, 0.4.
These figures may rise even more if
an arms race breaks out in South
America as a result of Venezuela's
proposed purchase of 100,000 AK47 assault rifles, 24 Super Tucano
Brazilian multipurpose aircraft, 40
Mig-29 fighters and possibly even
submarines from Russia, as well as
its deal to acquire 12 military trans-

port and surveillance aircrafts and
10 coastal patrol naval vessels from
Spain. In addition, according to
The Military Balance for the period
2004-2005, all of the countries in
the region, with the exception of
Argentina, have maintained a consistent level of active-duty forces.
Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador,
Peru and Venezuela have invested in
or are considering the upgrade of
their conventional forces. If the risk
of conventional interstate war is
remote in Latin America, how can

we explain this behavior?
One possible explanation is that
despite some reductions in the

political autonomy and influence of
the military in some countries, such
as Argentina and Brazil, the military
as an institution remains an important political actor in most of Latin
America. This political legitimacy
stems from the military's role as the
protector of the country, leading it
to justify its sizable existence and
spend its monetary resources-and,
in some cases, seek to expand its
budget-to purchase expensive conventional equipment.

The Solution: Revamping the
Military

Given the high levels of poverty
in most Latin American states and

the changed nature of threats in the
region, the current pace of military
expenditure and procurement is fiscally irresponsible and functionally
superfluous. Latin American states

should work to transition their militaries to a defense role better suited
to the threats and realities of the
new millennium. On the one
hand, internal threats-such as
extreme poverty, urban gangs and
drug trafficking-call for a domestic-focused special force under strict
civilian control. On the other
hand, external threats such as international terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction and porous borders
demand a force with greater intelli-

ART, CEREMONY, FOLKLORE AND CULTURE
Embodied Wisdom of Indigenous Andean Ecuador
APRIL 3-9, 2006
Join us for an exciting week of lectures, workshops and performances with
Susana Reyes, Moti Deren, Jorge Coello and Elena Ramos. Presented by
the Intercultural Dance and Music Institute (INDAMI) and Latin American
and Caribbean Center (LACC) at Florida International University, in cooperation with the Department of Theatre and Dance, the Department of
Religious Studies' Helen J. Dunnick Endowment for Native American

Studies, the College of Art and Architecture, and Pacific National Bank.
For more information, call 305-348-2894 or visit INDAMI's web site at
http://lacc.fiu.edu/indami.

gence-gathering capabilities and

sophisticated technology to monitor
sea and land borders. Since the
threat is no longer another standing
army or blue-water navy, Latin
America's militaries should transform into technically advanced,
highly mobile and lightly armed
special-defense forces under the
absolute and strict control of elected
civilians. The time to squander
financial resources on traditional
armed forces for internal political
purposes and nationalistic symbolism is over. The possibility of
intraregional, interstate wars in the
coming decades is close to zero, and
other nationalistic symbols can easily supplant the military in that
capacity. Costa Rica, for example,

has remained an independent, wellrespected sovereign state without
the added expenditure of a traditional military establishment.
Finally, in the current regional environment of relative interstate peace,
Latin American decision makers
should avoid bellicose language and
military procurement policies that
may trigger arms races, intense ani-

mosities and even armed conflict.
One solution is to transform the
armed forces from a traditional military posture to a small defensive
force under strict civilian control.

FElix E. Martin is an assistantprofessor in the Department of InternationalRelations at Florida
InternationalUniversity, where he
specializes in Latin American economic and security affairs and theories of internationalrelations. He is
co-editor of Latin America's Questfor
Globalization: The Role of Spanish
Firms (Ashgate, 2005) and author of
MilitaristPeace in South America:
Analyzing Conditionsfor War and
Peace (Palgrave/MacMillan),forthcoming in July 2006
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Democracy and Defense
by Rut Diamint

T

solidating and
he processesdemocracy
of conincreasing
have changed expectations about the elements that constitute state security.

4

During the Cold War the majority

consensus was that military power
and technological developments
guaranteed greater influence and
ensured better capacity for international negotiation. This view has

N°

yi

~

r

changed, and other principles now

"

appear to determine a country's

position among nations. Control
over communications, technological
advances, transportation and production flexibility are as crucial as
having a well-trained army, as is the
quality of democracy in any given

)

.

J

-

state.

The tension between democratic
weaknesses and new threats makes
it necessary to rethink the nature of
the military, the ultimate means of
power in relations between states.
The armed forces are the military
branch of foreign policy, complementing the objectives that a government establishes, but they
should in no way act as a factor that
obstructs government interests and
decisions.

[r

n1

The Military in a Democracy

The renewed legitimacy of the
values associated with democracy is
essential in discussing the role of
the military. In Latin America, military missions are influenced by
human rights policy, an international value that affects national policy
decisions. The Pinochet case, for
example, shows that civilian governments now have an ability to sanc-

10
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Brazilian soldiers search through a Rio favela looking for suspected drug traffckers. Some observers argue that such law and orderfunctions should be left to civilian police units and not the armed forces.

Features

The democratic management of defense and the
challenges of defining the military's new role
tion that they did not have 20 years
ago. To some degree, this has
changed the ability of states to
adopt authoritarian policies by limiting the ability of military officers
to carry out actions against civilians.

Democracy has expanded on the
continent at an uneven rate, however. Some nations are moving
toward processes of democratic consolidation while accepting military
prerogatives that create imbalances
between the decisions of military
institutions and other government
bodies. To mention a few cases, the
Mexican military rejects government interference; the government
of Paraguay cannot control the corrosive relationship between the military and former coup leader Lino
Oviedo; and Brazil, as Jorge
Zaverucha, Joao Martins and
Daniel Zirker document in recent
articles, entrusts the military with
handling defense and government
intelligence.
The military has undergone an
identity crisis as it has lost its traditional enemies and the operational
and doctrinal criteria of the past
have become outdated in terms of
offering solutions to an agenda now
determined by subregional integration. In addition, the majority of
Latin American nations made the
shift to democracy due to both
internal crises and conditions
imposed by international organizations. Democratization, therefore,
has been accompanied by reform,
which assumes strengthening institutions and adapting them to the
new determining factors of the
international market. The armed
forces do not play a central role at

the national level in this environment and because of this, they cannot go hunting for missions for
which they are neither prepared nor
have the appropriate tools. The
inclusion of the army in urban
operations carries the perception of
repressing crime. The military is not

trained to be on the street nor does
it have the appropriate tools to con-

trol citizens. The weapons of war
are not suitable for patrol activities;
moreover, the military is accustomed to a highly hierarchical chain
of command that is inappropriate
for handling civilian violations.
Each institution has a different purpose and in order for democracy to
function correctly, it is necessary to
avoid overlapping roles that could
jeopardize human rights. The
armed forces' role is to be an arm of
foreign policy, not a domestic police
force.
The Armed Forces and the
Economy
Government reforms create a
financial ceiling for the modernization of government jurisdictions,
including those related to updating
military equipment. International

financial organizations such as the
World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank lend
money to revitalize ministries and
decrease the quantity of public
employees, but they exclude from
these loans agencies linked to
defense and security. The conditionality package established by
international financial entities is
accompanied by indirect or informal pressures exercised by powerful
countries to influence the Latin

American armed forces to adopt a
predetermined agenda.
Even given these budgetary limitations, the arms race continues to
some extent in the region. Plans to
equip the Chilean Air Force have
created demands for modernization
in other countries. The Cardoso
government in Brazil sparked several internal crises after it announced
plans to build a nuclear submarine.
Peru was able to equip itself by
using war with Ecuador as a justification and via a corrupt alliance
between the Fujimori government
and military groups. Equipping the
Colombian armed forces to fight
guerrillas, as various Foreign Policy

in Focus documents assert, generates
a regional imbalance whose consequences will be revealed over the
long term. In the absence of specific defense policies and effective
regional accords, these trends revitalize military power.
Military Missions and Foreign

Policy
The post-Cold War context has
been a window of opportunity for
Latin American civilian governments to reformulate past conflicts
between neighboring nations. The
region's militaries have intensified
training with institutions from
other countries and increased their
combined operations and cooperation in missions under the mandate
of the United Nations. Such combined operations require transparent
criteria, doctrines and organizational modes by obliging defense ministries to reveal their weapons,
equipment and level of performance
to other nations.
Hemisphere Volume 16

11

Features

This transparency undermines the
perceived threats that justified earlier defense plans. Whereas past
cooperative military efforts-in particular, "Operation Condor," an
agreement between military governments in Argentina, Peru, Chile,
Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and

Brazil to pursue guerrillas across
national borders-were developed
under authoritarian governments,
joint operations are now coordinated by civil service employees.
These regional processes produce
security; neighbors are no longer
the enemy and in some cases can
even be partners against a specific
threat, as well as environmental
problems or rescue missions.
Measures to promote trust, meetings of the hemisphere's defense
ministers and operations between
different nations are part of a
framework in which each state
organizes its military activities supported by democratic criteria.
Peace missions deepen civil
defense since they are conducted by
civilian governments and the
United Nations. Those responsible
for administering the contribution
to peace missions are national government employees who represent
their respective governments at UN
headquarters. These diplomats
receive requests from the Security
Council and transmit them to their
governments. It is a purely civil
process that guarantees political
control over the military, reinforcing the institutional concept of
democracies and strengthening
internal negotiation processes
between agencies.
Finally, participation in peace
missions changes the criteria of
authority by changing chains of
command. Missions often include
forces from different countries led
by an officer from another nation.
The militaries that participate must
accept directives issued by officials
12
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with whom they maintain professional ties but not corporativist loyalties. In Cyprus, for example, the
Argentine army shared a mission
with British forces who had been
their enemies in the Falkland
Islands war. This peace mission
forced both countries to put their
respect for international law ahead
of the nationalist ideals that are
deeply entrenched in military tradition. The current peacekeeping
mission in Haiti unites troops from
various Latin American countries
under the command of a Brazilian
general. Such exercises exert control over the armed forces and promote democratic values, improving
the armed forces' professionalism
and contributing to the security of
their societies and the international

During the period of authoritarian rule, it was common for the
police force to depend on the army
for its mission and function and to
collaborate in internal repression.
Democratic governments have
reformed the police in an attempt
to separate foreign defense from
domestic security. Increasing levels
of urban violence and civilian insecurity, however, have led to an
overlap between military and police
functions, a situation that disrupts
institutional checks while failing to
provide solutions to public insecurity.
In response to the increase in
activities related to drug trafficking
and organized crime or the need to

community.

many governments are turning

Military Missions and Public
Order
States must articulate their power
with an international agenda in
which a series of public and private
players converge to face a set of
threats that are not necessarily generated by a government entity and
cannot be confronted by the capacities of one nation unilaterally and
autonomously. Jorge I. Dominguez
calls this situation "intermetics," as
there is no clear distinction between
international and domestic issues.
Just as 20 years ago civilians
claimed greater control over the
armed forces, today many demand
more military intervention in policing duties to improve security conditions. In many countries in the
region, police commitment to the
law is questionable; beyond failing
to protect citizens' rights, police
officers themselves are considered a
source of crime. Police forces across
the region have been denounced as
corrupt and linked to illegal activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling and extortion.

contain demonstrations expressing

discontent with social exclusion,
once again to the armed forces
when domestic security forces are
overwhelmed. Shortcomings in the
definition and civil management of
defense policies, combined with
government requests to carry out
actions directed at the civilian population, recreate old traditions of
military control over the citizenry
that should be eradicated in a
democracy.
A Fragile Balance
The expansion of terrorist networks and other organized criminal
activities, guerrilla movements
financed by drugs and kidnapping,
and the misuse of natural resources
require a response rooted in social
legitimacy. The basis for this legitimacy is society's express consent
that government actions reflect the
supremacy of a civilian authority
that acts in accordance with institutional norms. This guarantee is
essential to consolidate the rule of
law and to shore up the nation's
role on the international stage and
it must be accompanied by civilian
monitoring, whether by parliamen-
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tary, administrative, judicial,
ombudsman or civil society organizations. The mandate for civil control of the security apparatus is a
basic requirement of governability,
although lack of transparency and
reporting are problems in control-

ling the budgets for the different
branches of the armed forces.
Democracy has created expecta-

tions about the international legal
elements that grant security to

states. National and civil security
depends directly on observing con-

stitutional order, the laws and practices agreed upon by consensus.
No institution can have authority
or fulfill its public duties if it acts
outside the law. In Latin America,

the political game is still a major

democratic processes are fragile,
government employees continue to

Rut Diamint is a professor at
Torcuato Di Tella University and the
Buenos Aires branch of the University
of Bologna, as well as a researcherfor

display a lack of responsibility, and
mechanisms for transparency and
accountability are superficial. In a
context of public disapproval of
political parties, increased civil violence and deep asymmetries,
respect for the rules and legality of

challenge for Latin American

democracies.

Creating Communities in the
Americas (Woodrow Wilson

International Centerfor Scholars)
and CONICET

New from the University of Pittsburgh Press
POLITICAL (IN)JUSTICE
Authoritarianismand the Rule of Law in
Brazil, Chile and Argentina
by Anthony W. Pereira
Political(In)Justice compares the legal aspects of political
repression in three recent military regimes: Brazil (1964-

1985), Chile (1973-1990) and Argentina (1976-1983).
By focusing on political trials as a reflection of each
regime's overall approach to the law, Anthony Pereira
argues that the practice of each regime can be explained
by examining the prior relationship between the judiciary and the military. Brazil was marked by a high degree
of judicial-military integration and cooperation; Chile's
military essentially usurped judicial authority; and in
Anthony W Pereira is associate professor
ofpoliticalscienceat Tulane University. He
is the author of The End of Peasantry: The
Emergence of the Rural Trade Union
Movement in Northeast Brazil, 19611988, and co-editor of Irregular Armed
Forces and Their Role in Politics and State
Formation.aspects

Argentina, the military negated the judiciary altogether.
Pereira extends the judicial-military framework to other
authoritarian regimes-Salazar's Portugal, Hitler's
Germany, and Franco's Spain-and a democracy (the
United States) to illuminate historical and contemporary
of state coercion and the rule of law.
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The Hemispheric Security Agenda
by Michael W Collier

T

American States

he
Organization
Declaration
on of
Security in the
Americas (October

2003) greatly expands the scope of

the hemispheric security agenda.
In addition to traditional security
threats of terrorism, organized
crime and weapons of mass destruction, it cites such nontraditional
threats as extreme poverty and
social exclusion; natural and manmade disasters; HIV/AIDS, diseases

and other health risks; environmental degradation; human trafficking;
and cyber attacks. To address this
expanded agenda, the declaration
calls for ambitious measures to
strengthen bilateral and subregional
security and defense agreements
and cooperation. This article outlines a model for conceptualizing
the OAS's new multidimensional
approach to the problem and discusses several challenges that could
easily undermine the goal of
improved regional security.
Military and Law Enforcement

Roles
Eduardo Gamarra and Douglas
Kincaid, in a chapter of Latin
America in the World Economy
(1996), offer a security model that
encompasses three distinct security
categories-national security, public security and citizen security.
National security is handled by the
military and includes preparation
for and response to threats to the
state's territory, institutions and
sovereignty. Citizen security is the
responsibility of law enforcement
agencies and includes response to
14
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an array of threats to individual citizens. Public security is the gray
area between national and citizen
security. It involves threats to the
public at large that can quickly
overwhelm law enforcement agencies and thus require military
resources and expertise.
Table 1 adapts Gamarra and
Kincaid's model to include the
threats listed in the OAS declaration. It shows the three security
categories (national, public and citizen), the general threats associated
with each category, and the state
security forces most likely to
respond. The table does not
include several nontraditional factors cited by the OAS-extreme
poverty and social exclusion, and

forced military and law enforcement agencies to cooperate more
closely against the growing public
security threat. Joint military-law
enforcement operations are still a
relatively new concept for Latin
American security forces, and few
standard interagency procedures
exist. Neither military nor law
enforcement forces are versed in the

HIV/AIDS, diseases and other

tions proposed by the OAS pose a

health risks-which, while recognized as underlying causes of state
instability, do not lend themselves
to direct response by state security
forces and are better left to social

formidable challenge. The main
obstacles to executing not only
internal public security missions
but also those on a bilateral and
subregional scale include issues of
organizational culture, jurisdiction,
command authority and intelligence sharing. Added to this list
for bilateral and subregional operations are sovereignty concerns.
Given the nature of their differing missions, sizes, capabilities and
training, military and law enforcement organizations have completely
different organizational cultures
that can lead to interagency tensions and conflicts. Military cultures tend to be hierarchical with
almost religious-like devotion to
the rank structure and chain of
command. Military personnel are
trained to receive and comply with
orders and to look to their chain of

agencies.

As Table 1 shows, the hemispheric security agenda is complex.
Efforts to address it must involve
both a state's internal security operations and bilateral and subregional
security and defense agreements.
Historically, military and law
enforcement agencies have developed procedures and trained for
missions under the national and
citizen security categories outlined
in Table 1. Military and law
enforcement standard operating
procedures are normally well established in these familiar mission
areas. Over the past two to three
decades, however, the changing
regional security situation has

capabilities and operating proce-

dures of their new interagency partners and public security missions
are often carried out in a disorganized, ad hoc manner.
Challenges to Joint Missions
With intrastate security force
cooperation so difficult, the
increased interstate security opera-

command for support. They gener-
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Obstacles to cooperation between military
and law enforcement agencies

Categories

National Security

Public Security

Citizen Security

Nuclear exchange

Organized crime (drugs, arms,
human smuggling, etc.)

Assault/murder/rape

Robbery/theft/financial crimes

External invasion
Terrorism/weapons of

Border disputes

mass destruction

Kidnapping/extortion

Coalition war

Guerrillas/insurgencies

Political instability (normal)

Peacemaking

Illegal migration

Border violations (normal)

Peacekeeping

Disasters, natural and manmade

Corruption/fraud

Political instability (extreme)

Cyber attacks

Border violations (extreme)

Environmental violations

Law Enforcement Lead

Law Enforcement

Threats

Responses

Military

with Military Support

ally work in organizations where
formal and informal rules limit
their discretion while allowing for

accountability and successful mission outcomes. Law enforcement
agencies have strikingly different
organizational cultures. Law
enforcement agencies consist of
both uniformed police agencies and
specialized civilian agencies (customs, immigration, etc.) with the
authority to conduct investigations

and enforce local and state laws.
Law enforcement agencies employ

street-level operators who have
maximum discretion to act without
constant supervisory intervention.

In Latin America, these differing
organizational cultures must be
placed within the context of widespread abuse of power and corruption in security forces across the
region. This is the "elephant in the
living room" that US officials usual-

modate cultural differences and
overcome distrust of outside organi-

ly ignore in their interactions with
regional security organizations.

interagency conflict. Many region-

Abuse of power and corruption are
rampant among both senior and
junior security officials across the
region. A major challenge of combining military and law enforcement agencies in public security
missions is to establish standard
operating procedures that accom-

zations.

Agreement over the jurisdictions
of military and law enforcement
agencies involved in public security
missions is another area of potential
al leaders support the need for strict
separation of military and law
enforcement duties and point to
this as a tenet of liberal-democratic
philosophy. Supporters of this view

often justify their stance by citing
the US posse comitatus act. In fact,
posse comitatus is one of the most
misunderstood and misinterpreted
Hemisphere Volume 16
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US statutes ever enacted. The original act was passed in 1878 during
the post-Civil War Reconstruction
era to prevent the US Army from

violating the political and civil
rights of southern citizens. It
specifically allows US military
forces to become involved in law
enforcement activities "under circumstances expressly authorized by
the Constitution or Act of
Congress (18 USC 1385)." Citing
posse comitatus as a justification to
separate military and law enforcement powers, therefore, is a misreading of its intent.
Any bilateral and subregional
agreements that are created to
respond to the OAS declaration
must clearly define military and law
enforcement jurisdictions. In the

Under the umbrella of command
and control activities, one of the
most sensitive areas of potential
conflict in public security missions
is the sharing of intelligence among
joint military and law enforcement

United States, the military can pro-

forces. Information is power, espe-

vide reconnaissance, surveillance,
intelligence and investigation, command and control, communication,
transportation, medical, personnel
and other logistical support to law
enforcement agencies both within
and outside national borders. In
the US, except for cases concerning
military property or personnel,
search, seizure and arrest activities
remain the prerogative of law
enforcement. This appears to be a
reasonable model for regional states
implementing a multidimensional
security strategy.
Unity of command is a long-

cially in the corrupt security and
political systems found in most

standing security principle and

must be clear in both long-term
and crisis response missions. When
jurisdictional directives and standard operating procedures are not
clear on this point, bureaucratic
conflict and confusion quickly
result. Command authority can be
especially difficult to define in public security missions. Military leaders will argue they should have
command due to the large numbers
of personnel and other capabilities
they bring to the mission, as well as
16

their experience in controlling large
forces over expansive land and sea
areas. Law enforcement officials
will argue that since they are usually responsible for the "end game" or
final action in the missions, which
often consists of search, seizure and
arrest activities, they must be in
charge. All of these arguments are
valid. Legislatures and executive
branches have a responsibility to
issue clear jurisdictional directives
designating command and control
authorities in public security mis-
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sions.

Latin American states. Military

intelligence organizations and law
enforcement agencies tend to build
nearly impenetrable "stovepipes" to
protect their information. Adding
to the unwillingness to share information is a frequently misunderstood and misinterpreted web of
constitutional articles, legal statutes,
executive directives and service/
agency regulations establishing
intelligence sharing rules. Seldom
does one service or agency understand the intelligence sharing rules
of other services or agencies. It is
easy for those unwilling to share
information to stonewall other
services and agencies, undermining
the mission and feeding mistrust
among security forces.
Making public security missions
even more challenging on a bilateral or subregional scale is the issue of
state sovereignty. Latin American
states treat sovereignty as the equivalent of a natural resource to be
protected at all costs. Unfortunately, there is wide disagreement over

exactly what the concept of sovereignty entails. International rules
concerning state sovereignty have
changed dramatically over the last
60-70 years. The creation of the

United Nations in 1945 and the
end of colonialism after World War
II were watershed events in the
evolution of state sovereignty.
Before World War II, a state had to

earn its sovereignty and right to
nonintervention by showing it
could be a responsible member of
the international community. This
meant maintaining internal stability, following international norms
and providing public goods. As
many former colonies became
independent in the postwar period,
sovereignty and nonintervention
were simply bestowed upon states
by the international system. As
Robert H. Jackson notes in Quasi
States: Sovereignty, International
Relations, and the Third World
(1990), this new concept of sovereignty did not require any particular substantive condition in the
new state, only the observance and
forbearance of other members of
the international community.
Many states, including those in
Latin America, used this new
approach to sovereignty as a shield
to keep the international community from looking closely at illicit
internal behaviors such as corruption and human rights abuses.
Sovereignty became a favorite
excuse for states that lacked the
political will or political capacity to
comply with international require-

ments. In the post-Cold War era,
the rules of sovereignty are beginning to change back to the preWorld War II concept where states

must earn their sovereignty and
right to nonintervention. It is easy
to understand how conflicts over
sovereignty could complicate the
coordination of transnational public security missions.
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Successful Models of Cooperation
The OAS faces major challenges
in its attempts to expand the hemispheric security agenda and
strengthen bilateral and subregional
security and defense cooperation.
Conflicts between military and law
enforcement organizational cultures,
jurisdictions, command authorities,
intelligence sharing and sovereignty
pose serious obstacles to such initiatives.

At least two existing regional security organizations have overcome
these challenges. The Eastern
Caribbean Regional Security Service
(RSS) successfully integrates police
and defense force units from seven
English-speaking states. Since its
creation in 1982, the RSS has

responded to major natural disasters,
political unrest and law enforcement

incidents. Discussions are under
way to expand the RSS model to
several additional Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) states.
The US Joint Interagency Task
Force East (JIATF East), based in

Key West, Florida, is another highly
successful multilateral security force.
Since 1989, JIATF East has been
responsible for drug intervention
operations along the Caribbean,
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central
and South America and the Atlantic
approaches to Europe. It has been
able to overcome most of the jurisdictional, command authority, intelligence sharing and sovereignty
issues involved in transnational
interagency counterdrug operations
and is making record seizures of
shipments of illegal drugs to the
United States and Western Europe.

The main lesson learned in the
RSS and JIATF East success stories
is that it takes considerable time to

overcome the challenges to strengthening multilateral security forces,
both in establishing standard operating procedures and building interagency trust. These regional initiatives could serve as important models for new multilateral security
organizations resulting from the
OAS's expanded security agenda. U

Michael W Collier is director of
research at FloridaInternational
University's Latin American and
Caribbean Center. Dr. Collier spent
a 22-year US Coast Guard career
involved in the Caribbeansecurity
arena.

Forthcoming from the University of North Carolina Press...

CUBA AND THE TEMPEST
LITERATURE AND CINEMA IN THE TIME OF DIASPORA

by Eduardo Gonzalez
In a unique analysis of Cuban literature inside and outside the country's borders, Eduardo Gonz6lez looks closely at the
work of three important contemporary Cuban authors: Guillermo Cabrera Infante (1929-2005), who left Cuba for good in
1965 and established himself in London; Antonio Benitez-Rojo (1931-2005), who settled in the United States; and Leonardo
Padura Fuentes (b. 1955), who still lives and writes in Cuba. Through the positive experiences of exile and wandering that
appear in their work, these three writers exhibit what Gonzalez calls "Romantic authorship," a deep connection to the
Romantic spirit of irony and complex sublimity crafted in literature by Lord Byron, Thomas De Quincey and Samuel Taylor
Coleridge. In Gonzolez's view, a writer becomes a belated Romantic by dint of exile adopted creatively with comic or tragic irony. Gonzalez weaves into his analysis related cinematic elements of myth, folktale and the grotesque that appear in the
work of filmmakers such as Alfred Hitchcock and Pedro Almod6var. Placing the three Cuban writers in conversation with
artists and thinkers from British and American literature, anthropology, philosophy, psychoanalysis and cinema, Gonz6lez
ultimately provides a space in which Cuba and its literature, inside and outside its borders, are deprovincialized.
"A major work of scholarship and reflection by a uniquely talented critic in his prime. Employing an eclectic
approach that blends myth criticism and psychoanalysis, Gonzalez, at his best, is nothing short of dazzling."
-Gustavo Perez Firmat, Columbia University
Eduardo Gonzalez teaches literature and cinema at The Johns Hopkins University. He is author of three other books,
including The Monstered Self: Narratives of Death and Performance in Latin American Fiction.
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Military Internationalism
by Kristina Mani

Since

Latin American soldiers
199Os,internationalmany
become
have the
ized in unprecedented
ways. Internationalization
does not mean that militaries have
renounced either traditional defense
concerns, such as territorial defense,
disaster relief or even nation-building, or the range of nontraditional
security concerns that have garnered
attention since the end of the Cold
War, such as fighting drug traffick-

The second form of military internationalization is the contracting of
former soldiers and police by private military firms (PMFs) for service abroad. The current war in Iraq

has drawn attention to the important role that PMFs have assumed
in supporting the war efforts of traditional armies, but has raised little
awareness of the role that Latin
Americans have played in that
equation. Although military contracting from Latin America has

In the case of peacekeeping, polit-

ers or popular protesters active

provided a relatively small percent-

within national borders. Rather,
internationalization adds a compli-

age of PMF personnel in Iraq, at
least one PMF representative con-

ical leaders seeking mechanisms for
civilian control of the military
encouraged their militaries to par-

cating layer to existing concerns

fides that such contracting is a new

ticipate in UN-organized missions

over the roles that should be
assumed by militaries that now
operate in the context of electoral
democracy from Central to South

"growth industry" in the region. In

abroad. The most well-known case
of this was the Menem government

America. By internationalization, I
mean participation in a dense net-

work of state and nonstate actors
that is capable of providing
resources and opening new opportunities for its participants, allowing

them to achieve goals they could
not otherwise effect if they worked
only domestically.

what follows, I describe how internationalization provides partici-

pants in both peacekeeping and
contracting networks with opportu-

nities and resources that they otherwise lack in their domestic environment, discuss peacekeeping and

contracting trends in the region,
and identify some consequences for
Latin American countries from

involvement in both areas of activity.

In Latin America, two forms of

military internationalization stand
out. The first, and by far the dominant one, is participation in peace-

keeping missions through the
United Nations. While the heyday
of UN peacekeeping missions sub-

sided toward the end of the 1990s,
Latin American participation in
ongoing UN missions continues to
grow. More troops from Latin

American countries are involved
now than at any time in the 1990s:
11 countries field forces in 14 of
the UN's 16 peacekeeping missions.
18

The New TransnationalActivism.
Under this view, internationalization is a complex process through
which acting beyond one's borders
can dramatically transform conditions at home. Not only activists
but also democratic leaders and
military officers can participate in
such transnational and multilevel
networks, with the goal of transforming unfavorable conditions
they confront at home.
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International Opportunities and
Domestic Interests
Social movement theorists of late
have written much about the internationalization of activists through
advocacy networks that bind vertically (e.g., between governments)
and horizontally (e.g., between private domestic groups and international organizations) in ways that
offer "resources, opportunities, and
alternative targets... to make claims
against other domestic and external
actors," as Sidney Tarrow writes in

in Argentina in the early 1990s.
Through participation in peace-

keeping, it sought to downsize and
transform one of the region's most
aggressive militaries into a

respectable and tame institution
that could not only showcase
Argentina's new constructive international policies, but also expose
military officers to important
humanitarian tasks with peers from
countries where democratic civilian
control was an established norm.
The large number of officers from
the armed forces that served in UN
missions (particularly the army,
which has fielded over 15,000 officers since 1992) set Argentina apart
from other Latin American countries. Yet the positive impact within
the forces-including significant
professional engagement, an

improved reputation at home, and
additional pay-was evident, and
exportable to other militaries in the
region through CAECOPAZ, the
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Latin America's experience with peacekeeping
and military contracting
Argentine training center for joint
peacekeeping operations. In short,

both civilian leaders and military
officers became part of an "interna-

S

tional peacekeeping network"
involving a range of actors (govern-

ments, militaries, international
organizations like the UN, humanitarian organizations and advocacy
groups) that was able to contribute
to the transformation of the
Argentine military's image and

institutional interests. Most fundamentally, Argentina's participation

-W

in this network enabled government
officials to provide incentives for
military compliance with civilian
control, and it allowed officers to
lay claim to public recognition, better pay, and expertise in the pacific
applications of military force.
Like peacekeeping, military con-

tracting also involves a clear network dynamic, but one that
includes a different set of actors

-N

l-

(contracting governments or

defense ministries, private firms,
and the individuals they hire) and
appeals to different sets of individuals from country to country in
Latin America. The draw of this
"private military network" is evident in two examples of Salvadoran
and Chilean ex-soldiers contracting
with firms for work in Iraq.
In El Salvador, according to
reports in the Christian Science
Monitor and Washington Post, more

Chilean soldiers board a military
transport plane bound for Haiti. In
2004, they formed part of the UN's
internationalpeacekeeping force in the
troubled Caribbean nation.
Hemisphere Volume 16
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than 600 men and women with
prior military or police experience
were working in Iraq in early 2005.

Recruited by subsidiaries of USbased PMFs, such as Triple Canopy,
they assume jobs primarily as security guards, drivers and custodians.
Recruits are drawn to exceptional
pay levels: a security guard can
earn between $1,500 and $3,200 in

Iraq, about three times as much as
police salaries in El Salvador,
depending on rank. Hiring firms
are particularly drawn to the background Salvadoran ex-soldiers or
police can bring. Many recruits
were battle-hardened during the
country's long civil war. Facing

poor employment and pay opportunities at home, and familiar with
the violence of war, many are not
frightened by daunting conditions
in Iraq. As one noted to a reporter,

"I thank God for this opportunity
to go to Iraq." Some Salvadoran

officials have expressed concern for
the safety of the private recruits,
but have done little otherwise (El
Salvador was the last coalition
member from Latin America still to
field regular troops in Iraq; they
were withdrawn in August 2005).
In Chile, economic incentives
also play a significant role in private
contracting for Iraq, but in the
Chilean case, a more sophisticated
set of skills is on the market.
Blackwater USA initially hired in
2003 several dozen English-speaking former commandos for half- or
full-year employment in work such
as guarding oil facilities from insurgent attack. Blackwater's president
told the British Guardian in 2004
that "the Chilean commandos are
very, very professional and they fit
within the Blackwater system."
Former Chilean officers are drawn
to high pay ($3,000 to $5,000 per
month, plus benefits like life insurance) compared with salaries only
half to one-third as much back
20
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home. In Chile, this trend aroused
significant concern among civilian
politicians and military leaders.
Michelle Bachelet, Chile's defense
minister at the time, noted publicly
in 2004 that Chilean "mercenaries"
in Iraq might be subject to arrest or

detention in third countries, suggesting that some of the more senior commandos, retired in recent
years and now working in Iraq, may
have been involved in Pinochet-era
human rights violations. Others,
particularly in the military itself, are
concerned that private firms are
recruiting Chile's military elite away
from national service.
As the examples above reflect, the
trends in both peacekeeping and
contracting can be seen as the product of two big-ticket impacts affecting the region: democratization
and marketization within the
region, and the shift in great power
(especially US) concerns outside the
region, from humanitarian issues in
the 1990s to counterterrorism in
the 2000s. These structural condi-

tioners guide the opportunities and
constraints facing current and former soldiers in the region today.
Democratization has made achieving civilian control of the military a
key goal of political leaders and
civil society groups in the region; it
is also one that militaries can live
with if properly conditioned and
incentivized to the concept.
Marketization of economies in
the region have required budget
cutting, including reducing defense
spending, which has led to military
downsizing for economic as well as
political reasons. The contemporary introduction of democracy and
the market make peacekeeping an
attractive alternative mission for
militaries in the region. Yet it also
makes private contracting attractive
for some soldiers-those who buck
at the idea of civilian control at
home, and especially those who can

now reap greater payoffs through
the introduction of market dynamics into the military service "industry.

Shifts in greatpower concerns also
have worked to promote both of
these internationalizing trends. The
fact that major industrialized powers, notably the US, embraced
humanitarian-based missions during the early 1990s created a significant opportunity for Latin
American countries on the peacekeeping front-precisely at the
moment when the window for that
opportunity was most needed, as
several key states in the region were
beginning to consolidate democracy
(Argentina and Brazil stand out in
this respect). Several of those same
great powers, with the US as the
obvious leader, have since shifted
concern and support away from
humanitarian missions and focused
instead on counterterrorism operations. Interestingly, this shift
encourages the prospects for both
Latin American contracting and
peacekeeping. US attention to
counterterrorism quite obviously
feeds the contractor phenomenon,
as any "global war" that cannot be
fully staffed by national forces will
require outside help. So long as
demand continues and the market
price for hires is right, supply will
be available from Latin America
and elsewhere. The impact on
peacekeeping is more complex.
More than ever, peacekeepers come
from regional powers in the developing world (India, Pakistan,
Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil) with
expertise in the field and the desire
to stabilize their corners of the
world. These countries fill a vacuum of attention to crises that
require multilateral peace-building
efforts. Because the downgrading
of regional humanitarian crises is
not universally accepted, either by
these regional leaders or by smaller
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powers in the industrialized world,
Latin American forces are likely to
continue to play an important role
in UN missions, even if those missions may now be even less well
funded and more prone to setbacks
than before.
Recent Trends in Peacekeeping
and Contracting
As noted above, peacekeeping has
become a mission of growing
importance to militaries across
Latin America. With 2,435 troops

and police involved in UN missions
by the middle of 2005, Uruguay
has replaced Argentina as the
region's number one provider of
peacekeeping troops; it also fields
the UN force commander in
Cyprus, a post once held by an
Argentine. Brazil and Chile, too,
have joined the peacekeeping network in a significant way. Brazil
leads the peacekeeping mission in
Haiti, and earlier this year hosted
more than 500 commanding officers from 16 Latin American countries and the US for peacekeeping
operations exercises. With the
strong support of its current army

chief, Chile's military, once loath to
sign on for missions beyond its borders, now fields 585 troops in four
UN missions. Argentine forces still

remain prominent; they organize six
other Latin American countries'

troops in Cyprus, and contribute
paramilitary police forces to the
elite multinational Special Police
Units in Kosovo. Peacekeeping is
winning adherent forces from other
countries as well, as Table 1 on page
22 shows.

With respect to contracting, the
notion of "growth industry" aptly
captures recent trends. All told, the
number of former soldiers and officers hired from Latin American
countries to work abroad remains a
relatively small percentage of the
20,000 military contractors work-

ing in Iraq. Probably 1000-1500
are Latin Americans, based on the
estimates of the Washington Office
on Latin America (WOLA) and

various media estimates, as there are
no official statistics. It is still early
to assess the impact of foreign contracting on individuals or their (former) military institutions, but one
trend is clear: To date, contracting
in Latin America has been quite

successful, evidenced by a steady
increase in both recruits and the
number of countries being sourced
in the region by US PMFs. The
economic benefits or "claims-making" for all parties involved are even
clearer: Latin American ex-soldiers
earn more abroad than at home,
and firms like Blackwater can hire
them more cheaply than if they
recruit at home (in Iraq, a former
US Special Forces hire can earn
$700 a day, while a former Chilean
Black Beret will make about $150).
If to date PMFs have recruited
most heavily from El Salvador and
Chile, they are also looking at other
countries, including Argentina,
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Peru. It is worth
noting that as early as 1996, the
Colombian government authorized
the "subcontracting" of military
units to private oil companies operating in country in an effort to
enhance the protection of pipelines
at risk from sabotage and insurgent
attack. What is new is subcontracting abroad. The Central American
and Andean countries, of course, all
experienced civil wars where militaries were actively engaged in
counterinsurgency work. Yet
Colombia presents a particularly
keen recruitment base. Along with
counterinsurgency veterans from
wars in Chechnya and Algeria that
have found work in Iraq,
Colombians have not only been
recruited but apparently are organized and ready to go. As the Los

Angeles Times reported in July 2005,

an American who once worked for
Dyncorp International (a major US
PMF operating in Colombia) has

already assembled a "private army"
of 1,000 US-trained ex-soldiers and

police officers able to work in Iraq.
He argues that their long experience
and top-notch training make the
Colombian commandos ideal for
counterterror operations. Already
about 120 Colombians are contracted to Iraq, about the same
number as Chileans now in Iraq;

according to the Times, all of these
commandos have been recruited by
Blackwater. Again, economic

incentives drive much of the supply,
as early retirement for specially
trained Colombian officers yields
few subsequent job opportunities at
home. As Peter Singer of the
Brookings Institution notes about

Colombian officers, despite the
ongoing counterdrug and coun-

terinsurgency at home, "the global
demand is far higher."
Consequences Worth Considering
It is easy to see in Latin America's
peacekeeping involvement only positive developments, and in contracting only debilitating or nefarious
ones. Yet the picture is more com-

plicated. While peacekeeping missions keep troops professionally
engaged to the benefit of international security and self-image, much
depends on whether the mission
can provide a positive experience
for both the military in the field
and policy makers back home, and
whether it can ultimately succeed at
restoring peace and stability in the
affected country. The current mission in Haiti is instructive. Latin

America fields the lion's share of the
troops in Haiti, in one of the UN's
biggest current operations. Latin
American leadership in the Haiti
mission is a clear test of Brazil and
the Southern Cone countries to
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manage the region's international
security concerns on their own. If
the Haiti mission is successful, they
have the opportunity potentially to
displace at least some of the legitimacy the US has long assumed as
the main "solver" of security problems in the region.
Still, the Haiti mission is fraught
with peril. Short of manpower and
funds from the start, the blue helmets in Haiti have struggled for the
upper hand over armed gangs since
the mission began in June 2004.
As in several UN missions in Africa,
UN forces in Haiti have in the last
months adopted more aggressive
tactics, involving heavy firepower to
root out gang leaders by force in
targeted searches. In the process
civilian bystanders have been
injured, triggering investigation by
UN officials. It is no stretch to say
that the future course of Latin
American peacekeeping on its own
regional turf hangs in the balance
with the success or failure of the
Haiti mission. The experience will
also influence whether some of the
relative newcomers to such missions
(Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru) will
want to continue their involvement
if the mission is deemed a failure.
Critics of Latin American contracting to Iraq have raised a host of
concerns over that trend. One concern is that developing countries are
again providing cheap labor to serve
great power designs. Geoff Thale
of WOLA sees the process as a
poverty draft, in which a lack of
alternative job opportunities drives
Latin Americans to jobs in overseas
war zones; at the same time, hired
foreigners are a bargain expense for
their US-based employers. Along
with Thale, Singer holds that with
much dirty and dangerous work
outsourced to foreign nationals,
there are fewer political costs for
leaders of contracting countries, like
the US, when contractors are killed

or injured (by early 2005, over 175
contractors had been killed and 900
wounded, but these numbers are
rarely figured into publicized tallies
of dead or wounded). Some speculate that former Dirty Warriors
from the Southern Cone are now
working in Iraq, notably a handful
from Argentina and Chile, according to media sources in those countries. Yet with no clear public
record of who has been hired
abroad, these claims are hard to
confirm or refute. Last but not
least is the concern that PMFs are
draining the best trained and most
motivated soldiers, commanders
and police officers out of regular
service to their own societies.
Under this view, even if recruitment
remains limited, it can have an
important effect on the ability of
militaries in the region to retain
and build capable senior officer

tracting are here to stay indefinitely,
providing opportunities for military
engagement abroad that can transform a soldier's domestic condition
in ways that are not always immediately apparent. Ultimately, democratic policy makers in the region
must consider and assess the impact
of these two forms of internationalization on their militaries and on
their societies. Whereas peacekeeping was once seen as a panacea for
military transformation, it now
requires even greater dedication and
careful commitment to generate
comparable positive effects.
Similarly, military contracting may
ameliorate economic hardships for a
few, but its potential costs are far
from clear. Policy makers, both
military and civilian, will be wise
not to take these trends for granted,
or ignore them as they develop. U

corps.

There are ways to address some of
these concerns, at least in part,
through the regulation of private
contracting. In South Africa, for
instance, South African security
firms contracting outside of national territory must register and report
on their overseas work to a special
committee that advises the defense
ministry. Many PMFs (including
ones like Blackwater that recruit in
Latin America) ensure that recruits
are vetted for prior human rights
violations. However, the problem is
that violations are not always
recorded and might therefore be
overlooked. Moreover, regulation
involves greater oversight by state
officials into contracting activities,
yet such efforts require resources,
dedication and political will, all of
which are frequently scarce in countries facing broader crises of economic dislocation, public security
and poverty.
For Latin America, it seems that

KristinaMani is an assistantprofessor
in the Politics Departmentat Oberlin
College, Oberlin, Ohio.
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Charting New Waters
by Paul D. Taylor

N

gy in the Western
o
feature of US
Hemisphere
has stratebeen
more prominent in
the last two decades
than the drive to liberalize trade and
investment. This emphasis has been
intended to foster economic development and strengthen relations
between the United States and Latin
America. Policy makers have paid
relatively little attention to the effect
of free trade agreements on national
security, which we can define here as
reasonable freedom from danger to
the nation's territory, citizens, institutions and interests.
These issues came to the fore late
in the debate in Congress over the
free trade agreement with Central
America and the Dominican
Republic (CAFTA-DR). As senators
sparred over whether or not to
approve CAFTA-DR, they moved
beyond familiar arguments about the
economic effects of free trade agreements to include a greater emphasis
on security.

Security Issues in the Debate over
CAFTA-DR
Arguing in favor of the agreement,
Senator John McCain asserted that
CAFTA-DR was "important because

at stake is the future of Central
America in its economic and political
dimensions and, hence, its security
dimensions." He and other proponents reasoned that the agreement
would strengthen democracy by producing tangible benefits from free
market economics and partnership
with the United States.
Among the opponents to CAFTADR, Senator Hillary Clinton coun24
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tered flatly that "this agreement will
not promote democracy and stability
in these nations." In addition,
Senator Richard Durbin predicted
that relatively cheap corn from the
United States would undermine subsistence farmers in the region and
lead to increased illegal immigration.
"As we assault economies of Central
America," he argued, "we create economic instability which moves families into cities first, and finally, in
desperation, to anyplace they can go
to find any job to survive."
Proponents argued that by improving economies in the region,
CAFTA-DR would help reduce the
flow of migrants. Senator McCain
commented, "Ifthere is one lesson
we have learned in the challenge of
illegal immigration in this country, it
is that if people cannot feed themselves and their families where they
are, they will go to places where they
think they can." He suggested that
if CAFTA-DR were rejected, "thousands of apparel jobs would be lost as
[investors] moved production facilities from Central America to China,
further exacerbating illegal immigration to the United States." Senator
Richard Burr joined McCain in predicting that without CAFTA, more

and more garment manufacturing
would move to China. "As Central
American manufacturers [were]
forced out by Chinese manufacturers," he said, "more American jobs
[would] be put at risk for the simple
fact that Chinese manufacturers do
not use American yarn, they do not
use American fabric, and they do not

support: "Fidel Castro still oppresses
the Cuban people and denies them
precious human freedoms. Hugo
Chivez moves Venezuela closer and
closer to Castro every day. These
regimes tend to work to spread their
brutal methods and totalitarian
philosophies, trying to infect the rest
of Latin America, and we simply

cannot let them succeed. The free
nations of Latin America need our
support."
The Senate passed the agreement
by a comfortable but highly partisan
54-45 margin. Nearly four
Republican senators in five voted to
pass CAFTA-DR; more than threequarters of Democrats who voted
were opposed. In the House of
Representatives, it passed by a razorthin vote of 217-215.
Security Insights from NAFTA
Congress debated CAFTA-DR as
though it were the first US free trade
agreement with poor countries in the
Western Hemisphere. In fact, the
United States already has more than
a decade of experience with the
North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). This treaty
with Mexico and Canada provides a
wealth of insights that could be relevant to the working of an agreement
with Central America and the
Dominican Republic.
Economic Results. During the

use American cotton."

CAFTA-DR debates, senators frequently referred to the economic
results of NAFTA, described variously as a dismal failure or a solid success. The record shows that merchandise trade among the three

Senator Bill Frist saw CAFTA-DR
as an opportunity to convey political

years of the agreement grew 106%

NAFTA countries during the first 10
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The security implications offree trade agreements

z

PresidentBush signs CAFTA-DR during an event at the White House on August 2, 2005. Proponentsof the trade agreement

argue that it will bolster hemispheric security by strengthening democracy and creating economic opportunities.

compared to 42% for their trade
with the rest of the world. Foreign
direct investment in Mexico, which
had never exceeded $5 billion a year
before 1993, burgeoned to an annual
average of $13 billion from 1994
through 2002, with 63% coming
from the United States. In
December 1994, however, the peso
crisis forced Mexican leaders to
adopt austerity policies that
depressed their economy just as

The Needfor Complementary
Efforts. Since then, Mexico has failed
to make the investments in education and infrastructure that, together
with judicial reform, could have
added another 2% annually to the
country's growth, estimates Sidney
Weintraub, a senior fellow at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
In a recent study of CAFTA-DR,

trade and investment performance
did not meet the expectations of

World Bank analysts judged that
economic gains from this agreement
"would depend critically on the ability of the Central American

NAFTA proponents.

economies to pursue a complementa-

NAFTA took effect and as a result,

ry policy agenda, as the agreement by
itselfis unlikely to lead to substantial
developmental gains without parallel
efforts in areas like trade facilitation
(e.g. ports, roads, customs), institu-

tional and regulatory reforms, and
innovation and education."
Immigration. A trade agreement's
effect on immigration derives directly
from its effect on economic growth.
If it stimulates growth, it will create
jobs and thereby reduce the economic incentive for migration. Under
NAFTA, unauthorized immigration

from Mexico to the United States
continued its high pace as disapHemisphere Volume 16
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pointing economic growth rates in
Mexico coincided with strong activity in the US economy during the
1990s. In Mexico and Central
America, government attitudes
toward out-migration have been colored by the more than $16 billion
that Mexican workers in the United
States sent home in 2004 and remittances as high as 34% and 48% of
export earnings in the cases of
Nicaragua and El Salvador in the

year 2000.
Domestic Disruption. NAFTA
broke new ground by removing barriers to trade and investment
between a relatively poor country
and two prosperous industrialized
economies. The most difficult
adjustments for Mexico have been in
agriculture, an area in which more
efficient US producers often outperform Mexican farmers. The prospect
of increased corn imports from the
United States, for example, was a factor in the Zapatista rebellion in
Chiapas. Mexico's agricultural problems reflect two realities. First,
Mexico has not succeeded as promised in creating urban employment
to offset the displacement of inefficient rural workers. A second factor
applies to all trade liberalization
efforts: It is far easier to identify the
losers than the winners. People are
more likely to know individuals who
lost their jobs because their plants
moved or closed as a result of
NAFTA than to realize that others

owe their jobs to the trade-creating
effects of the treaty. Furthermore,
most consumers accept the improvements in purchasing power that
derive from the efficiencies of freer
trade without consciously linking
them to trade agreements.
Effects on Democracy. Partly as a
result of liberalizing trends under
way before NAFTA, Mexico has
become a more democratic country
over the past decade. The agreement
has contributed directly to the
26
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strengthening of democracy in two
ways. One is the increased contact
Mexicans now have with outsiders,
especially in the United States. The
heightened interest of the foreign

increased interdependence between
their two countries could provide an
incentive for terrorists to injure the
US economy by attacking Mexico.
One possible target is the Mexican

press, foreign investors and non-gov-

petroleum industry. Mexico supplies

ernmental groups of all kinds has
given Mexicans a sense that what
happens politically in their country
is noticed elsewhere. In addition,
after six decades of rule by the
Institutional Revolutionary Party, the
deregulated world of NAFTA allows
the Mexican government a smaller
role to play relative to the private sec-

more than 15% of US petroleum
imports, second only to Canada
among foreign sources. There is no
evidence that the terrorist threat to

tor.

Relations with the United States.
When President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari decided to pursue NAFTA as
a way to stimulate foreign investment and economic growth, his government expanded its consular operations in all areas of the United
States that had significant Mexican
populations. Mexico's 45 consulates
came to comprise the largest network
of any foreign government in the
United States. At the same time,
Mexico adopted a highly pro-active
diplomacy with an enhanced
embassy staff in Washington and
retained professional lobbyists and
public relations experts. Although
this effort was mounted initially to
build support for NAFTA, its ongo-

ing consequences have been active
engagement across a range of issues
and the most productive bilateral
cooperation in the history of the two
countries. Politically important businesses have become partisans of
resolving issues and avoiding interruptions of trade and investment. In
the aftermath of 9/11, they have
emerged as advocates of border controls that enhance security without
hampering trade flows, such as the
expedited passage of pre-approved
trucks.
Commerce as a Target. Some security specialists in both Mexico and
the United States worry that

NAFTA commerce is more than

hypothetical, but increased trade
produces vulnerability. Globalization
provides both a target and a vehicle
for terrorism: A successful attack
against commerce would likely bring
about a reduction in trade and
tourism, a decline in foreign direct
investment and lending, and a
downturn in economic activity and
employment in the countries
involved.
Differences between NAFTA and
CAFTA-DR
All of these results hint at CAFTADR's potential security effects, but
there are some differences between it
and the Mexican case. The most
obvious, perhaps, is the influence of
Mexican history. Mexico lost half of
its territory to the United States in
the 19th century; although past US
interventions are also a fact of life in
Central America and the Dominican
Republic, they did not lead to territorial losses. These differences may
explain a 2005 Latinobardmetropoll
which showed that positive opinion
of the United States among
Mexicans just barely exceeded negative opinion while net Central
American opinion was more than
60% positive, the highest in Latin
America. Troops from the
Dominican Republic and three
Central American countries partici-

pated in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
and most citizens of the region look
to the United States more for solutions to their problems than as the
cause. Many Central Americans rec-
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ognize the tremendous effort that
President Bush and other supporters
expended to win passage of CAFTADR. A rejection of the agreement
could have profoundly demoralized
citizens of Central America and the
Dominican Republic and shaken
their confidence in the reliability of
the United States.
A second difference has to do
with size. Central American and
Dominican leaders will likely be
eager to receive financial and technical assistance from the United States
to accomplish the ancillary improvements needed to assure the developmental potential of the free trade
agreement. Because their economies
are far smaller than Mexico's, their
needs are more manageable within
the capacity of international donor
organizations.
Another way in which NAFTA
differs from other trade agreements
is the fact that the United States and
its contiguous NAFTA partners con-

duct 90% of their trade by truck,
rail or pipeline. By contrast, terrestrial conveyance to the United States
is not an option for the Dominican
Republic, and less then 3% of
Central American commerce with
the United States moves by land.
Maritime and air transport involve a
different set of security issues.
Trade Agreements and US
Hemispheric Policy

The Bush administration has
given trade agreements pride of place
in its overall Latin America and
Caribbean policy. Had two members of the House of Representatives
voted differently on CAFTA-DR,
however, the United States would
have had nothing to reinforce the
trade liberalization that has characterized US policy in the Western
Hemisphere since the late 1980s.
The closeness of the vote on
CAFTA-DR could be an omen of
more difficulties to come.

Congressional partisans on both
sides acknowledged that as they
voted they had in mind the precedent that CAFTA-DR could create
for a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) and the Doha Round of
global trade negotiations. Absent
new developments, this legislative
outcome adds little momentum to
an aggressive trade strategy.

At the time of the CAFTA-DR
vote, negotiations for the FTAA, first

proposed by George H. W. Bush
and pressed again by George W.
Bush, had already missed the deadline for completion of negotiations
in 2005. The talks were essentially
deadlocked over the treatment of
agriculture, with Brazil leading the
forces demanding termination of
production subsidies and an increase
in market access. While favoring
these objectives in principle, the
United States has been unable to
concede these points without first
winning agreement from the
European Union and Japan, a result
which could be accomplished only at
the Doha Round. A further complication is the 2006 mid-term congressional elections in the United
States. Judging from the degree of
partisanship displayed in the
CAFTA-DR vote, the outcome of

these elections could affect both the
FTAA and Doha negotiations. At
the same time, talks are quietly
under way for bilateral US free trade
agreements with Panama, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru. If they are completed, free trade agreementsincluding NAFTA, CAFTA-DR and
the US-Chile agreement that entered

Rumsfeld wrote, "I consider CAFTA
to be as much a security issue as it is
an economic issue-for them and
for us." Whether achieved through
the FTAA or additional subregional

free trade agreements, closer trade
and investment relations could
imply security consequences in the
areas of domestic disruption, support
for democracy, immigration and
relations with the United States.
Each of these factors could be affected by circumstances unique to particular countries. First, recent events
in such countries as Bolivia, for
example, demonstrate a particular
sensitivity to foreign investment,
especially where natural resources are
involved. Second, although NAFTA
had an impact on governance in
Mexico, the prospect for improve-

ments in this area is far less likely in
several of the Andean countries.
Third, for a trade agreement to
affect the rate of migration it has to
affect the rate of economic growth
and employment, which, in turn,
may depend on domestic policy
changes to complement the opportunities created by a reduction in
barriers to trade and investment.
Finally, it is hard to imagine that
closer trade and investment relations
with the United States would not
contribute to closer relations on
other matters. The increase in trade
disputes that inevitably accompanies
an increase in the volume of trade
may suggest otherwise, but greater
trade weaves a fabric of interdependence that usually produces positive
results beyond commerce.

into effect in January 2004-will

cover more than 80% of US trade
with Latin America and the
Caribbean even if no FTAA is concluded.
Conclusion
During the debate over CAFTA-

DR, Secretary of Defense Donald

PaulD. Taylor is a senior strategic
researcherat the US Naval War
College. As a Foreign Service officer,
his assignments included Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State responsible
for economic relations with Latin
America and ambassadorto the
Dominican Republic.
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Into the FAR Future
by Miguel Angel Centeno

t is biologically certain that
on some future morning,
Cubans will wake up to a
world without Fidel.
Despite the obvious significance of that moment, we lack
much of the information necessary
to prepare for it. We don't know
Fidel's health, no one has any idea
of the real state of popular legitimacy of the revolutionary regime,
and we can only guess at how
Miami and Washington will react.
Perhaps most importantly, we do
not know how much violence will
accompany the start of the new
era, how we may control it, or who
will do so and how. Despite the
vehemence of most disagreements
about Cuba, most can agree on a
few things.
First, beginning in the late
1980s, Fidel reversed the "bureaucratization" of control and made
the regime more personalistic than
at any time since its early years.
While Raul Castro has long been
designated the official successor, his
age and limited base outside of the
armed forces (FAR) make him an
unlikely bridge to the future. This
means that the nature of the
regime will need to change.
Specifically, post-Fidel Cuba will
not be able to rely on his particular
personal and historic charisma nor
the network of control established
through the Castro brothers.
Second, whatever government is in

charge will have to deal with at
least a short-term crisis of expectations, not only in Havana, but
across the Straits of Florida.
Whether seen as a "crisis of confidence" or, alternatively, as a
28
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"moment of opportunity," the first

few days of the transition will be
critical.
Over and above longer-term concerns, the problem of maintaining
social and political order will be of
critical importance not only to
Cubans on the island, but to many
in the US, particularly in Florida.

Therefore, the Cuban military
(FAR) will no doubt play a critical
role in either permitting the survival of the regime, establishing a
new order, or merely serving as a
referee of a transition.
Unfortunately, we probably
know less about the internal affairs
of the Cuban military than we did
about its Iraqi equivalent in 2003.

The parallels between the two
armies go beyond our ignorance.
In both cases, the extent of ideological commitment to regime values is uncertain. Both have been
dominated at the top by a core
devoted to family and personal loyalty. Like the Iraqi armed forces,
the FAR has rapidly degenerated
from arguably the most powerful
military in Latin Americauniquely able to project its power

across an ocean-to an almost
exclusively infantry-based force of
reduced size, with little operational
capacity beyond the brigade level.
As was the case with the Iraqi
army, there is no longer any doubt
about the Cuban military's inability to resist even a relatively limited
invasion force. But, as in the case
of Iraq, that institutional capacity
may no longer be relevant. What
should concern us in the case of
Cuba (as we have seen in Iraq) is a

parallel set of questions:

Could the Cuban FAR retain
enough institutional stability to
guarantee order during any period

of transition?
Whom or what alternatives
would it support?
Could it frustrate the imposition

of a new regime no matter its ideological coloration?
All reports indicate that the FAR
has retained a strong professional
coherence in the face of drastic
challenges over the past 15 years.
Despite its deep involvement with

the marketization of the Cuban
economy, on which it has relied to
maintain minimum operational
balance, the military has not developed into a kleptocracy; military
discipline has been maintained up
and down the hierarchy. There
are no indications of particularized
allegiances to regional commanders
(though, of course, control of the
Western Army with responsibility
for Havana is critical). Even when
faced with difficult tasks of popular
control or natural disaster relief,
the army has maintained its organizational coherence. The FAR is not
the army of Batista, literally disintegrating in the face of a threat.
Would the armed forces be willing to take active control of the
island if ordered to do so? In light
of what happened in Baghdad in
2003, no one should dispute the
critical importance of this question. Guessing the intentions and
feelings of conscripts is impossible,
but all indications point to a positive answer. Does the military
have the capacity to maintain
order? If it were to be distracted in
repelling some external actor, the
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The role of Cuba's armed forces in the
country's inevitable transition
answer would be no. If outlawed
by dictate, obviously not. But if it
were allowed to continue its institutional existence and if it could
concentrate on maintaining control
of major cities and transport and
communication links, even its limited resources should be adequate
to maintain order. Thus, the FAR
represents a (the?) potential cornerstone for a transition.
The real question is whether in a
fight for power, the loyalties of
those owing allegiance to Raul
Castro-who has been personally
responsible for the career fate of
practically any military officer of
even semisenior rank-would conflict with those seeking regime
change. After the Ochoa trial of
1989, there has been no sign of a
perestroikawing in the army. No
other government institutions exert
significant influence on soldiers
(just the opposite) and civilian
leaders such as Felipe Pdrez Roque
or Carlos Lage do not appear to
have developed any kind of network within the FAR. The real
threat to military coherence may be
the general disposition of the
members of the officer corps
toward their social and professional
future. On the one hand, if many
in the FAR feel that they can survive a transition with their positions intact and even with continued links to the business they have
developed, then the loyalty to the
old order may be fragile. On the
other hand, if the FAR feels that it
will be punished and its soldiers
become part of a stigmatized
unemployed class, then its willingness to obey orders leading to its

own liquidation should be in
doubt.
The example of Iraq obviously
brings to mind the ability of elements of the FAR to go beyond
merely resisting a transition and
actively fighting a new regime.
Again, we are dealing with speculation based on skimpy knowledge
regarding uncertain futures, so no
guarantees are possible; but nothing that has been written about the
FAR in the past decade would
indicate that we are dealing with a
group of dedicated fanatics willing
to continue with a campaign of
violence. Given the shift in government rhetoric over the past
decade from a socialist ideology
toward a more nationalistic one, it
is much more likely that the military would do its constitutional or
institutional duty and not purposefully make life a living hell for
ordinary Cubans.
As in the case of Iraq, it may not

be Cubans we have to worry about,
however, but external actors. The
likeliest sources of violence in a
transition regime are not dissatisfied soldiers (again, unless they
have been made to feel that they
have no future in the new establishment), but a variety of economic and political gangsters. The
appeal of Cuba as the perfect transshipment point for drugs into the
ever-hungry US market cannot be
overestimated. If the US and
Mexico have not been able to control the Rio Grande, a Cuba in
chaos certainly will not be able to
guarantee the policing of its territorial waters. Equally worrisome,
the collapse of order in Cuba

would invite the creation of a semimafia state similar to that experienced in Russia in the 1990s.
Precisely because of the ambiguities
of property rights and other contentious issues, there will be a clear
social role for those who can provide nonofficial force. Combined
with the less than savory practices
of some of the anti-Castro groups,
this does not make for a happy
transition.

In the end, again as in Iraq, the
most we can hope for in a postFidel world is that social order is
maintained and that Cuba can proceed with a transition to whatever
future awaits it without the distraction and chaos we have seen in
Iraq. The only possible way to do
this is to provide all possible assurance that the FAR, as an institu-

tion, can continue in its basic role
as a guarantor of internal peace and
defender of national territory. As
tempting as it may be to settle
scores, or alternatively, as enticing it
may be to use the army to deny the
inevitable, we can only hope that
the FAR will be around and functioning on the morning after.

MiguelA. Centeno is a professor of
sociology and internationalaffairs
and director of the Princeton
University Institutefor International
and Regional Studies. From 19972004 he also served as master of
Wilson College at Princeton. He has
authored or edited nine books.
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Mexico's Armed Forces
by Arturo Sotomayor

For

entists have told us that
decades, exercises
political anscihegemony
important political influence on countries and the
international system. An easy case
for hegemonic theory should be
Mexico, where the influence of the
United States is evident in almost
every social, political and economic

An atypical example of the
effects of political liberalization
role for Congress in national poli-

tics. Not all institutions have followed the same path of change,
however; the armed forces, among

dimension, except for military

many other actors, have lagged

affairs. While the US gives high
priority to strategic and military
considerations, and even awards
allies for their military contribu-

behind. In fact, many Mexican
specialists argue that the transition
to democracy has weakened civilian
institutions, shaking the foundations of the barriers once built to
prevent military involvement in
politics. Today, the Mexican military is probably less modern and
effective and far more politicized
and nationalist than it was 10 years

tions against terrorism, Mexico has
gone precisely in the opposite direc-

tion, ignoring military affairs and
disregarding security matters. True,
the country has experienced domestic changes that have modified the
nature and structure of its foreign
policy. To a certain extent, the
transition to democracy brought
with it important institutional
changes, including a more active

Opposite:A Mexican soldier helps sur-

vivors of the deadly mudslides and
floods in southern Mexico caused by
HurricaneStan in October2005.
Humanitarianreliefis one of the pillars of the Mexican armedforces'
strongly articulateddomestic mission,
which also includes providingpublic
services in ruralcommunities, containing insurrectionsand halting organized
crime. While most military institutions respond to external imperatives,
such as defending the nation against
external threats, the different branches
of the Mexican armedforces, in contrast, have traditionallyfocused on
their internalroles.

ago.

labor sectors were incorporated into
the party itself in 1938. By 1946,
when the first civilian president was
elected, the military had not only
been unified and disciplined but
had also been successfully subordinated to civilian power. To ensure
that the armed forces would remain
loyal to the hegemonic party, the
PRI limited its budget, reorganized

military zones and imposed an educational agenda that focused explicitly on developing loyalty and discipline toward the party and civilian
leadership. In other words, as
Roderic Camp and Monica Serrano

argue, military-party links regulatThe Collapse of Consensus
Under the PRI
For almost 70 years, the stability
of civilian supremacy in Mexico
was based on the legacy of the
Mexican Revolution and the hegemonic party system. In 1929,
when the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) was
founded, soldiers and civilians
agreed to a pact committing the
former to accept the demilitarization of politics and the latter to
concede institutional autonomy.
With no higher authority than the
party, this pact facilitated the division of labor and made possible the
emergence of a consensus placing
special emphasis on civilian
supremacy. To counterbalance and
politically neutralize the power of
the military in the PRI, peasant and

ed, managed and co-opted the mili-

tary's political behavior. In
exchange, the armed forces were
given institutional autonomy to
decide promotions, doctrine, operations and strategy. (Camp 1992,
Serrano 1995).
The collapse of the PRI's hegemony in 2000 and the political
instability that has followed have
disturbed relations between civilians and soldiers. Some observers
even believe the transition has upset
the military institution itself.
(Serrano 2003). The problem
Mexico faces today is quite different than the civil-military challenge
of most South American countries
when they redemocratized in the
mid 1980s. Mexico had a system
of civilian control but lacked democratic forms of accountability. The
Hemisphere Volume 16
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military did not represent the main
obstacle to political liberalization;
consequently, there have been fewer
incentives for military reform and
modernization, since the armed
forces are not perceived as a hindrance to competitive party politics.

A Growing Role in Politics
As a result of these trends, the
military has gone from having a
primary role as the agent of the

Nevertheless, serious pathologies
have been unleashed by the democratization process that affect civilmilitary relations and foreign policy. The lack of interest in military
affairs among civilians has opened a
window of opportunity for the
armed forces to shape doctrine
without civilian intervention.
Congress exercises weak civilian
oversight; most politicians know
very little about the military and
tend to be more interested in economic and social issues. As an
institution, the military maintains
an important degree of independence and autonomy. The absence
of a unified, civilian-led ministry of
defense has been a constant feature
of Mexican politics and a sign of
the weakness of civilian control.
The armed forces are opposed to
the establishment of a defense ministry under civilian control, a position motivated by their desire to
preserve direct political representation and access to the presidential
cabinet.
The civil-military balance of

of its own self-generated desires.
This does not necessarily mean that
the armed forces are oriented
toward regime overthrow but it
does reflect their preoccupation
with retaining some influence within the new democracy. In the
absence of clear democratic civilian
control, the military leadership has
assumed a more outspoken position
toward government policies. The
Minister of Defense, General
Gerardo Vega Garcia, for example,
recently expressed strong public
criticism of the judicial system and
civil government, an indication that
the military is becoming more
politicized as the country attempts
to democratize. For Roderic
Camp, the politicization of the
armed forces appears to reflect the
pattern that as the press and other
groups take more active interest in
military affairs, the military, in
turn, has taken more open interest
in government decision-making.
(Camp 2005, 6).
One area where the armed forces,

power has serious policy implica-

in general, and the Army, in partic-

tions for US-Mexican relations.
Under the current status quo,
Washington does not have civilian
co-partners with whom to discuss
bilateral military and defense matters. Strictly speaking, the US
should not have problems dealing
with foreign militaries; it did so
effectively during the 1960s and
70s, when bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes were the common political feature in Latin America.

ular, are resistant to change is in
their participation in peacekeeping
operations. In the past two years,
diplomats in the Cancilleria
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs) have
more actively sought to involve the
armed forces in such missions.
Reaction among the military has
been divided. The Navy, which has
more international exposure and is
smaller than the Army, has already
devised a plan to allow its personnel to join a peacekeeping force by
2006. The Army has led the oppo-

However, Mexico is no longer con-

sidered authoritarian and in a
32

democracy one expects civilian
elected officers, not generals, to be
in charge of security policies.
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hegemonic party to being the agent

sition to this type of engagement,
arguing that peacekeeping is not a
part of its domestic mission. Some
Army officials also point out that
joining a force abroad might make
Mexican soldiers more vulnerable
to accusations of human rights violations by the international media
and non-governmental organizations.
In June 2005, Patricia Olamendi,

the deputy foreign secretary for
multilateral affairs and human
rights, resigned in protest after
presidential spokesman Rubdn
Aguilar flatly contradicted her statement that Mexico might someday
contribute personnel to peacekeeping missions. Apparently, the
Defense Ministry had complained
that a civilian in a non-military
bureaucracy was meddling in the
affairs of the armed forces, which
have traditionally opposed any
engagement abroad. Soon after the
military commanders complained,
President Vicente Fox made it clear
that his administration would never
authorize sending Mexican troops
on United Nations missions.
The reasons advanced by Army
generals to abstain from joining a
UN force are multiple. First, it is
argued that most Mexican soldiers
do not fulfill the foreign language
requirements established by the UN
for observational posts, since
English courses have never been
part of the mandatory military curricula. Second, there is a serious
concern about over-stretching missions when the military is already
engaged in multiple operations at
home. Third, the military has
shown anxiety about an increased
involvement of US military forces
in UN peace operations and regards
diplomatic efforts as attempts to
denationalize Mexico's defense
strategy and geopolitical thinking.
Finally, there are questions about
budgets and costs associated with
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peacekeeping missions, since it is
expected that the Ministry of
Defense and not the Foreign
Ministry will be responsible for
supplying troops, vaccines, uniforms, gear and equipment for the
missions (none of which are subsidized by the UN).
Focus on Domestic Affairs

Theoretically, most military institutions respond to external imperatives, such as defending the nation
against external threats. The different branches of the Mexican armed
forces, in contrast, have traditionally focused on their internal roles.
As Fredrick M. Nunn writes, "in

the absence of police capabilities
they have responded to the internal
imperative by participating directly
or indirectly in internal affairs.
Riots, strikes, rebellions, long-term
insurgency, and rescue missionsthese all bring armies into conflict
with civilians and force officers to
confront socioeconomic and political realities, to take sides." (Nunn
1984, 43). The rationale that
drives the Mexican armed forces is
their role in national development,
which consists essentially of maintaining control over the intelligence
community, providing public services in rural communities, containing insurrections and halting
transnational organized crime.
Externally, the armed forces have
never had the appetite to project
power abroad, in part because since
World War II Mexican soldiers
have not dealt with any real military enemies. Mexico is too small
to fight a war against the United
States and too big to battle the
small and weak states to its south.
Even along the border with the
United States-where efforts to
control drug trafficking and, now,
terrorism are a priority-the peril is
not armed invasion but daily
socioeconomic interaction with a

powerful neighbor. The armed
forces' external role, as a result, has
been limited to safeguarding coasts.
The armed forces' domestic missions (antinarcotics, antiguerrilla,
police training and humanitarian
relief) reinforce their newly politicized attitude and resistance to
assuming an external role. In the
past three years, the Mexican
authorities have replaced almost the
entire law enforcement apparatus to
combat drug trafficking with soldiers, and generals and colonels
have assumed numerous key political appointments and governmental

positions. In addition, the military's internal role and the associated effects of transnational drug trafficking have led to pervasive corruption among soldiers and officers. Accusations of human rights
violations are common but rarely
penalized, and soldiers rarely face
civilian trials if accused of committing a crime.
Against the conventional wisdom,
therefore, the liberalization of politics in Mexico has made the armed
forces even more inward-looking,
nationalist and xenophobic. The
absence of democratic civilian control and accountability means that
civilian leaders are not responsible
for designing or shaping military
missions and defense policy.
Although the country is located
next to the largest military power in
the world, its defense policy is simply not integrated into its foreign
policy, nor does it reflect its new
democratic status. This may have
negative domestic and international
consequences. The absence of civilian control may jeopardize attempts
to consolidate the incipient democratic process. Likewise, while
Mexico is the United States' third
largest trading partner, its inability
to provide military support to
Washington makes it a less than
reliable neighbor and ally, particu-

larly at a time when the US administration has prioritized strategic
and military security concerns. In
this sense, Mexico's democratic
challenge consists not only of modernizing its economy, but also its
archaic military sector.
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Dangerous Ambiguity
by

Zrica Cristina Alexandre

Winand and Hictor Luis Saint-Pierre

Faced

domestic security issues
withgovernment's
growing
and the
inability to overcome
them, Brazilians seek a
reliable and effective form of
defense. Without understanding
the constitutional limitations, lack
of experience, specific training or

capabilities, or for that matter the
different moral doctrines of the
armed forces, many people look to
military barracks for a solution to
their plight. The use of the armed
forces as police backup or to contain and repress drug trafficking
and organized crime has become
one of the most controversial topics in the nation's political debate.
The Lula administration's
approach to defense policy is based
on past mistakes that reinforce historical ambiguities related to the
armed forces' mission. Current
defense strategy exacerbates problems inherited from previous governments, including lack of transparency and an inconsistent relationship between civilian administrators and the military. It also
allows for the gradual increase of
secondary roles for the armed
forces that surpass their constitutionally attributed functions.
Greater Involvement in Domestic
Security
Addressing the Military Club in
his first speech after Lula's inauguration, then Defense Minister Josd
Viegas argued that in the postCold War period the Brazilian
armed forces have shifted their
emphasis away from national security to citizen security. The mili-
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tary's new mission, he continued,
"substitutes an excessive preoccupation with the security of the state's
apparatus with an emphasis on the
security of the nation that prioritizes citizens and their choice of
the country's political future."
This is a worrisome declaration
since it confirms the armed forces'
participation in missions for which
they have neither adequate training
nor a constitutional mandate.
Viegas suggested employing the

armed forces in secondary roles to
respond to more broadly defined
security threats, including drug
trafficking, organized crime and
environmental violations. Such
missions increase military autonomy, perpetuating dangerous prerogatives that pose a potential

threat to democracy. The way
Viegas made his proposals only
increased this perception. Any
changes to the military's role
require constitutional amendments
adopted only after extensive legislative and social debate. The minister restricted his comments to
members of the military, however,
allowing them to deliberate alone
about the armed forces' involvement in tasks that extend beyond
their constitutional role.
Viegas defended the armed
forces' participation in social programs as an opportunity to give
them a role in supporting social
development. Among the potential
areas for their involvement he cited
the Zero Hunger program, repair
and expansion of the nation's highways, and health and education.
While acknowledging that
Brazilian society has historically

limited the armed forces' mission
to defending national sovereignty
and territory, he argued that current security threats represent a different set of circumstances that
demand a multidimensional
response, including a more diverse
role for the armed forces.
The arguments used by Viegas
and others to justify these operations are insufficient. By failing to
define a chain of command, they
prevent an effective distribution
of responsibility, a potential problem in the case of casualties.
Proponents of involving the armed
forces in the battle against organized crime argue that the military
brings logistical support and intel-

ligence to such missions, as if these
could substitute for appropriate
judicial or political experience.
The role of the armed forces is
established in the constitution and
does not include participation in
crime fighting missions. Article
144 of the Brazilian Constitution
assigns such actions to the police
force: "National security, the state's
duty and the right and responsibility of all, is executed with the intent
to preserve public order and the
integrity of the population and
their assets through the work of the
following institutions: I- federal
police; II- federal highway police;
III- federal railway police; IV- civilian police; V- military police and
military firefighters."
A Problematic History

Several times in recent Brazilian
history, the armed forces have been
called out to support the local
police in operations for which they

Reports

Proposals to expand the role of the
Brazilian armed forces
were neither prepared nor
equipped. In Rio de Janeiro in
1992, 35,000 troops were charged
with the security of foreign and
national authorities who attended
the World Environmental
Conference. Also in Rio, the Army
and Marines were deployed on the
streets and entered the favelas
(shantytowns) in 1994. This time
the troops stayed for two months,
and despite overall consent that
security had increased, crime levels
remained the same. In 2003, fol-

lowing a request by Rio de Janeiro
Governor Rosinha Matheus,
President Lula authorized the use
of an armed forces contingent to
beef up security during Carnival.
Finally, the armed forces were
called in as reinforcement during
the presidential election in 2002
and two years later during the
2004 local elections.
In all of these operations, collateral civilian deaths occurred, a fact
that is not surprising given that the
role, mission, training and equipment of the armed forces prepare
them to annihilate the enemy.
Military intelligence and operations are not geared toward compiling legal evidence to aid in the
capture of criminals and delinquents. In contrast, the police force
has a constitutional mandate to
combat crime as the armed branch
of the judicial system. Police officers are trained and equipped with
this objective in mind, and police
intelligence is specialized in dismantling criminal networks and
fighting delinquency. If the police
cannot accomplish these tasks efficiently, then the state should focus

on improving their capabilities
instead of relying on the armed
forces to make up for their shortcomings. In any event, calling out

the armed forces has more of a psychological effect than a real impact
on crime. As in the case of Rio in
1994, the population may feel safer
with the troops on the streets but
organized crime remains firmly in
control.
More ominously, granting the
armed forces nonspecific state
functions can lead to military
intervention in national political
affairs. Minister Viegas's experi-

ence hints at this danger. In 2004,
he was forced to resign, a step that
may have been related, among
other things, to his deviation from
his functions. Viegas had already
irritated the armed forces by
neglecting their request for salary
increases and failing to address the
problem of obsolete military equipment. His comments about
employing the armed forces in
domestic missions, particularly
against organized crime, brought to
the forefront the constitutional and
doctrinal limitations of such
actions. After his resignation, the
position of defense minister was
assumed by Vice President Josd
Alencar, who, Lula promised,
would not tolerate miscommunication between the military and the
government.
Lula clearly understands the risks
that civilian authorities run when
they knock on the military's door.
Alencar is less involved in ministerial functions than his predecessor,
a position that is more in tune
with the military's preferences. In

June 2005, the government articu-

lated a new defense policy for
Brazil that attempts to reconcile
the nation's defense agenda with
foreign ministry objectives. At the
domestic level, however, some of
Viegas's proposals have been implemented, and the armed forces continue to be used in an auxiliary role
in such tasks as combating organized crime and maintaining highways. This reality not only reflects
the state's impotence but also distorts the essential function of the
armed forces. By encouraging the
militarization of law enforcement
and other efforts to expand the
armed forces' domestic role, the
Lula administration runs the risk
of allowing potential threats to
democracy and the civilian order.
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Promoting Security Cooperation
by joss Ruiz

T

dent throughout the world. ThirSouthern Command,
he
United Statesin
headquartered
Miami, Florida, is one

of the Department of
Defense's unified commands, with
responsibility for US military activities in an area of operation that
spans over one-sixth of the earth's
surface and includes 30 nations and
11 territories across Central

currently contribute more than
6,100 security personnel to 16
United Nations peacekeeping opera-

tions in places such as Haiti, Sudan,
Kosovo, Afghanistan and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Multinational cooperation is also
ongoing in Central America, where
security forces are working together

America, South America and the
Caribbean.
Mission. With more than 6,000
military and civilian personnel,
SOUTHCOM conducts military

to counter cross-border illicit activities and establish a combined
Central American peacekeeping bat-

operations and security cooperation

assist partner nations with providing

activities to promote hemispheric
stability and security, establish

aid and improving social conditions
in the region, SOUTHCOM sponsors an engineering and medical

regional partnerships and support
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teen partner nations from the region

talion.

Humanitarian Assistance. To

2005, SOUTHCOM sponsored 70
such activities, providing medical
services such as pediatrics and general surgery to more than 200,000

patients from 21 nations. Military
veterinarians also participated in
these exercises, inoculating more
than 60,000 livestock to mitigate the
potential human health hazards that
can result from the population's
direct contact with animals. In
2006, 70 additional medical exercises are scheduled to take place in 18
countries across the region.
Disaster Preparedness. SOUTHCOM sponsors exercises, seminars

and conferences to improve the collective ability to respond effectively
and expeditiously to disasters. In
2005, SOUTHCOM sponsored

democratic institutions. From
SOUTHCOM's perspective, regional challenges such as poverty,
inequality, natural disasters and corruption create conditions that foster
unconventional and transnational
threats. These threats, which
include narcoterrorism, illicit trafficking and criminal gang activity,
place the stability, security and prosperity of the democracies within
Western Hemisphere at risk.
To address these challenges,
SOUTHCOM sponsors annual
exercises with partner nations that
include scenarios ranging from

assistance program known as New
Horizons. In 2005, the Command
sponsored New Horizons exercises
in Haiti, Panama, El Salvador and

Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias in

Nicaragua, investing millions of dollars to construct schools, clinics,
community centers and water wells,
and providing outpatient medical
care and health services. New
Horizons exercises also provide US
military engineering and medical
personnel an opportunity to practice
their skills in a forward environment, enhancing their capability to

nations. A 21-nation, disaster

operate as mobile teams. In 2006,

Relief Warehouses and prepositioned

SOUTHCOM is projected to spon-

peacekeeping to disaster relief, and
from counterdrug to counterterror.

sor New Horizons exercises in the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador,

In 2005, SOUTHCOM conducted
nine major multinational exercises
with 33 countries and territories
focused on multilateral approaches
to foreseeable contingencies.
Peacekeeping. Some examples of

Honduras and Peru.
Medical teams also deploy inde-

regional cooperation are clearly evi-

Readiness Training Exercises. In

relief supplies across the region.
Construction of eight additional
Emergency Operation Centers and
seven additional warehouses is ongoing across the region.
Counter Illicit Trafficking.
SOUTHCOM's Joint Interagency
Task Force-South, oversees counter
illicit trafficking operations with the
support of liaison officers from 11
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pendently from New Horizons, pro-

viding both general and specialized
medical care to the populations as
part of stand-alone Medical

Trinidad and Tobago, a disaster preparedness planning seminar that
included the participation of 27
response exercise is scheduled to take
place in Honduras in 2006.
Because logistical sustainment and
coordination is critical to ensuring
the success of any future disaster
relief operation, SOUTHCOM has
also supported the construction or
improvement of three Emergency

Operations Centers, 13 Disaster
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The role of the United States Southern Command in
humanitarian and collaborative security functions
nations and 10 federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Through an elaborate intelligence
network that includes Cooperative
Security Locations in Aruba/
Curacao, Ecuador and El Salvador,
JIATF-South detects, tracks and

monitors suspected traffickers in the
region. In 2005, the Task Force

contributed to the seizure of 217
metric tons of cocaine.
War on Terrorism. Also among
SOUTHCOM's priorities is the war
on terrorism. Terrorist groups oper-

ate globally with apathy for human
life, contempt for international law
and irreverence for the sovereignty of
nations. As part of the ongoing war,
SOUTHCOM conducts detention
and interrogation operations at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where

Lima, Peru-Communicatorsfrom Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,Peru and
SOUTHCOM conduct a conference among regionalsecurityforces to exchange
ideas on improving transparency in the management ofpublic information.
(Photo by US Air Force Master Sgt. Jose Ruiz)

more than 500 enemy combatants
are currently detained. Additionally,

camps and reducing terrorist attacks
nationwide by more than 40 per-

lion for countries in the region to

SOUTHCOM works in coopera-

cent.

tion with security forces from part-

The Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua
have all contributed forces to support the global war on terror, and El
Salvador recently deployed its fifth

modernizing their security forces.
SOUTHCOM's cooperation initiatives are rooted in its vision to be
the recognized partner of choice and
center of excellence for regional
security affairs in the Western

ner nations to prevent terrorist
groups from using their territories as
sanctuaries to prepare, stage, finance

or conduct terrorist operations
against the US, its allies or vital

interests in the region.
In Colombia, where narcoterrorists have killed and kidnapped thousands of citizens, SOUTHCOM
provides support to the country's

security forces in the form of training, equipment and logistics.
Thanks in part to this support,

contingent to support coalition
operations in Iraq.

Military-to-Military Activities.
SOUTHCOM's other engagement

activities in 2005 included 78 conferences, 76 subject matter expert
exchanges, nine senior level visits
and 24 unit exchange programs.

Revolutionary Armed Forces

Through these activities, the
Command secured professional
development training for more than
3,000 military and security personnel from the region. Additionally,
through the Department of State,
SOUTHCOM secured foreign mili-

(FARC), destroying 400 FARC

tary financing in excess of $100 mil-

Colombian security forces have
become an effective instrument for
their national defense, recently retaking 11 villages formally under the
control of the Colombian

assist them with equipping and

Hemisphere. US long-term interests

are best served by a hemisphere of
stable, secure and democratic
nations. Through its continued
cooperation with partner nations,

SOUTHCOM will continue to seek
ways to enhance security and stability in the region and extend the benefits of freedom and economic prosperity to all the citizens who call our
community of nations home.

Jose Ruiz is with the Public Affairs
Office at the US Southern Command,
Miami, Florida.
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Over the Pacific Ocean-An E-3 Sentry airbornewarning and control systems aircraftrefuels off the western coast of
Ecuador before patrollingthe skies over South America as part of combined counterdrug operations in cooperation with
regional security forces. (Photo by US Air Force Master Sgt. Efrain Gonzalez)

Casamacoa, Honduras-Villagers
gather relief supplies delivered by a
US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter
on November 20, 1998. The helicopter carried 11,000 pounds offood
and clothing to the village. More
than 1,800 US servicemembers par-

ticipated in the distribution offood,
water and medical aid to Central
American residents affected by
Hurricane Mitch. (Photo by US Air
Force Tech. Sgt. Thomas Cook)
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BabilProvince, Iraq-Salvadoran
Coalition Military Assistance Team
soldiers meet with the sheik ofa small
village for a ribbon cutting ceremony
in July 2005 celebratingthe completion of a road connecting several villages in the province. (Photo by US
Army. Sgt. Arthur Hamilton)
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Guantanamo Naval Station, CubaA marine guards detention operation
facilitiesfrom a security tower at
Joint Task Force-Guantanamo.
(Department of Defense photo)
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Port-au-Prince,Haiti-Peacekeepers
from Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Croatia,Franceand Peru
stand in formation during the transfer of responsibility to the United
Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti on June 25, 2004. More than
3,500 security personnelfrom 10
Latin American nations are currently
serving in MINSUTAH. (Photo by
US Navy Petty Officer 1st Class
ChristopherSherwood)
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Tepetitan, El Salvador-US airmen and Salvadoran soldiers build a new medical clinic during a New Horizons project,
February2005. This exercise provided two new schools and three medical clinicspreviously affected by earthquakes. (Photo
by US Air Force Staff Sgt. Reynaldo Ramon)

Palo Grande, Nicaragua-Navy
Nurse Lt. William Jansak (left)
applies eye drops to a young
Nicaraguan boy during a Medical
Readiness TrainingExercise in March
2005. A joint-combinedservices engi-

neering and humanitarianaid mission builtfour schools and two medical clinics. (Photo by US Navy Petty
Officer 2nd Class Brian Brannon)
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Chimborazo and Tungurahua
Provinces, Ecuador--A local girl
enjoys fresh waterfollowing the
drillingof a water well as part of a
humanitarian assistance project.
(Departmentof Defense photo)

4

San Vicente, El Salvador-A US
Army specialistgives a puppy preventive health care during a veterinary
medicine assistance visit in April
2005. (Photo by US Air Force Tech.
Sgt. John M. Foster)

Fuerte Lautaro, Chile-Multination-

al soldiers show their countries'colors
afterparachutinginto the closing ceremoniesfor Cabanas,a peacekeeping

a

i

exercise conducted in 2002. More

than 1,300 military and civilianpersonnel from Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Paraguay,Peru, Uruguay and the US

participatedin the exercise. (Photo by
US Air Force SeniorAirman Stacy L.

Pearsall)

Hemisphere Volume 16

41

UPDA

LICATIONS

PU

E

Civil-Military Relations
by Marian Goslinga

Latin

military intervention has
America's
fore theof
to the history
brought
need to re-examine the
region's civil-military
relations. While military dictatorships were the norm in the 1960s
and 1970s-only Costa Rica,
Colombia and Venezuela avoided
authoritarian rule-today an elected government rules in every Latin
American country with the excep-
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Chivez Frias, Hugo, and Marta

Today, the euphoria that accompanied this dramatic decline in military influence has begun to wane
as the continuing pattern of instability, poverty and violence plaguing the region threatens to undermine democracy. The bibliography
below looks at some of the issues
pertaining to contemporary civilmilitary relations and presents
viewpoints from the North as well
as from the South.
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SocialPhotos is a cooperative of photographers
that works to create and distribute images documenting and addressing issues of social justice. We
actively strive to build collaborative relationships with
progressive organizations engaged in work on the
issues we cover, in order to encourage the most
effective, constructive use of our photos.
Online photo catalog at:
http://www.socialphotos.com/
There you will find: human rights, exploitation &
modern slavery, Third World-related subjects, poverty & hunger, housing & health, children in risky situations, women's issues, social work, religion, environmental degradation, minorities...
And also those same people laughing, playing,
loving, dancing, sharing, giving a hand, dreaming...
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